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This paper studies how portfolios with a global 
investment scope are allocated internationally using a 
unique micro dataset on U.S. equity mutual funds. While 
mutual funds have great flexibility to invest globally, they 
invest in a surprisingly limited number of stocks, around 
100. The number of holdings in stocks and countries 
from a given region declines as the investment scope of 
funds broadens. This restrictive investment practice has 
costs. A mean-variance strategy shows unexploited gains 
from further international diversification. Mutual funds 
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investing globally could achieve better risk-adjusted 
returns by broadening their asset allocation, including 
stocks held by more specialized funds within the same 
mutual fund family (company). This investment pattern 
is not explained by lack of information or instruments, 
transaction costs, or a better ability of global funds 
to minimize negative outcomes. Instead, industry 
practices related to organizational factors seem to play an 
important role. 
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1.  Introduction 
The increase in global financial integration over the last twenty years has been 
remarkable, and U.S. institutional investors that purchase foreign assets have been 
significant participants in this growth.
1  Given standard economic theory, one would 
expect to see greater international diversification accompanying the expansion of global 
investment opportunities. Indeed, a number of studies show the gains that may be 
achieved from such diversification.
2  To date, however, evidence on how investors 
actually allocate their portfolios around the world and what determines it is still limited.  
In this paper, we aim to fill the gap in the literature by constructing a unique 
micro dataset of asset-level portfolios for a group of important institutional investors. We 
then document the main stylized facts regarding their global asset allocations and study 
the factors behind their portfolio decisions, in particular how the organizational structure 
of financial intermediaries affects international investments. To conduct the research, we 
analyze U.S. equity mutual funds with an international investment scope. We find that, 
although mutual funds that invest globally have significantly expanded the size of their 
assets, they have been noticeably restrictive in the range of stocks they hold. In fact, they 
tend to invest in about the same number of stocks (100 stocks) than mutual funds with a 
more limited (regional or country) mandate do. Moreover, they forgo potential gains from 
international diversification. This investment practice is not explained by lack of 
information or instruments, transaction costs, or a better ability of global mutual funds to 
minimize tail risk. Instead, it seems to be largely driven by industry practices related to 
how mutual fund families structure their operations. These organizational factors seem 
important to understand how managers and families (companies) allocate their portfolios 
internationally.  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Obstfeld and Taylor (2004), Stulz (2005), and Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2009). 
2 On the supply side of funds, investors can reduce risk for a given level of expected returns (or increase 
returns for a given level of risk) by investing internationally. A number of studies provide some evidence 
on the gains from international diversification. See, for example, Grubel (1968), Harvey (1995), De Santis 
and Gerard (1997), Errunza, Hogan, and Hung (1999), De Roon, Nijman, and Werker (2001), Goetzmann, 
Li, and Rouwenhorst (2005), and Driessen and Laeven (2007). On the demand side, firms and governments 
can reduce the cost of capital, finance new projects, and decrease the exposure of their balance sheets to 
some domestic macroeconomic shocks by tapping international investors. See, for example, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), Stulz (1999), Van Wincoop (1999), Bekaert and Harvey (2000), and Gozzi, Levine, and 
Schmukler (2008).    3 
Focusing on mutual funds offers important advantages. First, mutual funds, unlike 
other types of institutional investors, such as hedge funds, pension funds, and individual 
international investors, face regular reporting requirements. Thus, asset-level portfolios 
for mutual funds can be constructed and traced over time since their inception. Second, 
the structure of mutual fund families allows us to make within-family comparisons of the 
behavior of “specialized funds,” which can invest only in certain countries or regions, 
and “global funds,” which can invest anywhere in the world and thus have access to a 
larger set of instruments (more firms from more countries). Knowing that a fund within a 
mutual fund family holds certain stocks is an indication that the transaction costs to hold 
them are not exceedingly large and that those stocks are indeed desirable (at least to other 
fund managers within the same family). Moreover, information about those stocks has 
already been collected at the family level and, in principle, might be available to all 
managers in that family. Therefore, the relevance of information sharing, transaction 
costs, and industrial organization aspects discussed in the literature can be analyzed by 
comparing portfolios across funds within the same mutual fund family and across 
families. In addition, the returns of specialized funds can be compared to those of global 
funds, shedding light on the payoffs of different investment strategies. 
We collect portfolio holding and return data for the universe of actively managed 
open-ended U.S. mutual funds established to purchase assets around the world. The data 
on holdings contain asset-level annual portfolios between 1991 and 2005. We work with 
a total of 499 fund families and 1,904 funds. The total number of fund-year observations 
is 8,420 and the total number of asset-level holdings for all funds in all years is 
1,359,750. The portfolio holdings have been matched to identify the country to which 
each stock belongs, tracking holdings over time. We use daily returns at the fund level 
between September 1989 and June 2006 for 36 fund families that have a variety of 
mutual funds for which useful comparisons can be made.
3  We work with a total of 
722,885 daily observations, comprising returns for all funds from these families.  
Three stylized facts about mutual fund international investments emerge from our 
analysis. First, global funds have grown much more than specialized funds. For example, 
                                                 
3 For the return data, we focus on the largest mutual fund families in terms of assets under management 
and/or number of individual mutual funds. We are constrained by the need to concentrate on families with 
both global and specialized funds to make useful comparisons.     4 
in 1992, assets under management by global funds were about three times as large as 
those managed by specialized funds; by 2004, global funds had grown to be six times as 
large (US$530 billion) as specialized funds (US$89 billion). Second, both specialized and 
global mutual funds hold a similar number of stocks (the average number of stocks is 150 
and the median 95). In other words, the number of asset holdings in mutual fund 
portfolios does not tend to be higher for global funds compared to specialized funds 
within the same mutual fund family, even though the pool of investable assets is 
significantly larger for global funds. For example, global funds belonging to 
Oppenheimer Funds held on average 100 stocks in 2004 while its emerging market fund 
invested in 125 stocks. Similarly, in 2004, AIM Family of Funds’ global funds held 105 
stocks on average, whereas its specialized funds held 102 stocks on average. Third, 
within each region of exposure, global funds hold fewer assets from fewer countries 
when compared to specialized funds within the same mutual fund family. For instance, in 
the case of Latin American holdings, the median specialized fund holds 41 stocks, 
whereas global funds hold only around three stocks (94% fewer stocks than specialized 
funds within their mutual fund families). Furthermore, global funds also invest in 75% 
fewer countries in Latin America than specialized funds (about two countries compared 
to six). The restrictive pattern of investment by global funds is relevant as global funds 
are investing an increasing amount of funds in stocks from a limited set of companies and 
countries. The natural question is then, what can rationalize this investment pattern.  
We argue, first, that instrument availability and transaction costs do not appear to 
explain the stylized facts mentioned above. To start, mutual funds could increase the 
number of stocks they hold since there are many stocks available for investment that are 
not included in mutual fund portfolios. For example, in the case of Vanguard funds, even 
though they tend to invest in many more stocks than funds from other families, the 
number of stocks they hold still seems relatively small. In 2004, Vanguard funds held 482 
stocks on average while the number of listed stocks worldwide was more than 39,000. 
While high transaction costs could be an impediment to expand the number of stocks in 
the portfolios (not all listed stocks could be bought at a low cost), they do not seem to be 
driving the results either. The cross-fund comparison is revealing regarding transaction 
costs. More specifically, the fact that one particular fund holds a certain stock is an    5 
indication that there are no clear investment restrictions related to that company. 
Furthermore, mutual funds hold, on average, a very small fraction of market 
capitalization. Global fund and specialized fund investments account (separately) for just 
0.12% of firms’ market capitalization. This suggests that mutual funds are not large 
relative to the stocks they hold and thus might be able to increase their exposures without 
incurring major costs. In the case of global funds, they could also expand the range of 
assets they hold by investing in the same stocks that specialized funds hold (to the extent 
that specialized funds are not heavily exposed to the average company).  
Second, we find that lack of information at the mutual fund family level alone 
does not seem to explain the apparent lack of international diversification. If global and 
specialized funds within families shared information and made similar decisions, one 
should observe that they hold similar portfolios (or that global funds follow specialized 
funds to the extent that the latter know better each particular country or region). 
However, we do not find evidence consistent with managers using, to a large extent, 
information already gathered and/or processed by other managers within the same mutual 
fund family. For example, global and specialized funds share only 16% of their holdings 
(or, on average, 36% of net asset value of investments). Moreover, portfolios become 
more similar when global and specialized funds are managed by some of the same 
managers; and the similarity increases with the number of common managers. Thus, to 
the extent that it is costly to gather and process information and managers compete with 
each other within families, one would observe portfolio choices consistent with the ones 
documented in this paper. In sum, industrial organizational aspects of the mutual fund 
industry could partly explain the restrictive international investment practices. 
Third, we show that mutual fund family effects appear to be a strong driving 
factor of the portfolio choices of individual funds. For example, funds in the Templeton 
Group held on average 129 stocks in 2005, significantly fewer than the 517 stocks held 
on average by funds in the Vanguard Group. In fact, family effects explain almost 50% of 
the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the number of stock holdings and the 
portfolio loadings on the top ten holdings, vastly exceeding the explanatory power of 
commonly used measures that capture the ability of funds and managers to gather and 
process information and make portfolio choices. These family effects point to the    6 
importance of organizational norms at the company level that determine how different 
funds pick stocks, and go beyond restrictions and organizational practices at the fund 
level that affect how each individual fund allocates its portfolio. Family effects are not 
fully captured by the observables we have included in the estimations and may 
encompass, among others, norms about investment policies, top management preferences 
and practices, and internal optimization algorithms. 
The fact that global funds do not tend to hold more stocks than specialized funds 
does not necessarily imply a diversification loss. If assets within and across countries 
were perfectly correlated, global funds could obtain the same degree of diversification 
benefits as specialized funds do by simply holding fewer stocks, possibly in fewer 
countries. Thus, return correlations could account for the patterns observed in the data, 
implying no return losses or excessive variance for investors. To explore this issue, we 
use first a mean-variance optimization framework to estimate the performance of 
simulated global funds (constructed as a portfolio of specialized funds from the same 
global fund family) and compare it to the performance of actual global funds.
4 By 
definition, this is a very restrictive exercise, since simulated global funds cannot choose 
among all the stocks available to specialized funds, but rather they must invest in a 
portfolio already held by another fund within their fund family. This guarantees that the 
stocks are available for investment (i.e., that we are considering a feasible set), that they 
are attractive to at least one other manager in the same family, and that information about 
the stocks was already collected and analyzed by someone relatively close to the global 
fund manager. Our results suggest that there are potential gains from further international 
diversification. Global funds could obtain better risk-adjusted returns if they invested in 
portfolios that include holdings similar to those of specialized funds, even within the 
same mutual fund family. In other words, by not increasing the number of stocks as funds 
expand their investment scope, global funds forgo the benefits that broader international 
diversification entails. For example, we find that the average return of global funds could 
increase between 2.6% and 5.5% per year if they maximized daily or weekly returns 
                                                 
4 Each simulated global fund also includes a non-negative weigh on the global fund itself. The nature of 
this exercise is different from the one performed by Evans and Archer (1968), which studies how the 
variation of returns for randomly selected portfolios changes as a function of the number of securities in the 
portfolio.    7 
following a mean-variance approach. The results are robust to many types of estimations 
that take into account expected returns, variances, and benchmark effects.  
We also use the simulated global funds to look beyond a mean-variance 
framework and explore the possibility that there is an insurance premium in the returns of 
global funds. Because global funds, unlike specialized funds, can secure gains by moving 
away from troubled countries during crisis times, investors might be willing to pay for 
this benefit by accepting lower expected returns. Our results indicate that global funds do 
not seem to better shield investors from tail risk. We find that the skewness and kurtosis 
of global fund returns are similar to those of the simulated global funds. Higher moments 
of the distribution of returns are important if global funds were to minimize losses during 
bad times instead of following standard mean-variance models. Moreover, conditional on 
large negative returns on either specialized funds or the MSCI Emerging Market Index, 
we find that returns of the simulated global funds are broadly similar to those of global 
funds. In sum, the lack of diversification does not seem to be explained by a better 
performance of global funds during turbulent times. It is nevertheless possible that global 
funds provide some other unobservable benefits that are not captured by the mean-
variance and other analyses performed in this paper. 
Our findings contribute to several strands of the literature. First, our paper relates 
to a large literature on the extent of investor international diversification. Most of this 
research has concentrated on aggregate measures to explain the determinants of 
international investments and on country portfolios to study the degree to which countries 
hold assets abroad.
5 More recently, researchers have begun to exploit asset-level data 
based on institutional investor portfolios, although the evidence remains scarce.
6 Our 
findings on mutual funds with global reach reinforce the existing evidence of growing but 
still limited international diversification. Furthermore, our results provide evidence that 
some of the usual explanations for these international investment patterns, such as the 
relevance of transaction costs and the lack of available information, are not sufficient to 
                                                 
5 A large part of the literature has focused on the home bias puzzle, starting with the seminal work of 
French and Poterba (1991). See Tesar and Werner (1995), Brennan and Cao (1997), Kraay, Loayza, 
Serven, and Ventura (2005), Portes and Rey (2005), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2008), among many others. 
6 See, for example, Strong and Xu (2003), Cai and Warnock (2006), Eun, Huang, and Lai (2008), and Hau 
and Rey (2008).    8 
fully address the findings in this paper.
7 Limited information does not seem to be a driver 
of limited international diversification in the sense that information is available at the 
mutual fund family level. The problem arises on how information is shared across funds 
within a family. Moreover, the lack of diversification is not driven by the inability of 
global funds to purchase more securities or at least the same securities that specialized 
funds hold, since each individual fund invests in relatively few stocks, the fund 
allocations are small compared to the size of the market, and specialized funds tend to 
hold more securities in each country and region. In other words, the results do not seem 
to be driven by instrument availability or transaction costs. Instead, our findings suggest 
that organizational factors within the finance industry, overlooked by the international 
literature, explain at least in part the limited degree of international diversification. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on how financial markets work by studying 
portfolios within and across mutual fund families, which sheds light on the drivers of 
international portfolio allocations. The industrial organization literature, broadly 
understood, emphasizes the role of management practices in affecting corporate 
behavior.
8  Furthermore, this literature highlights the relevance of idiosyncratic firm 
effects (beyond the usual factors related to the production function, plant effects, demand 
factors, or even managerial effects) in explaining corporate behavior, diversification 
strategies (across products), productivity, and performance.
9  Our findings on mutual 
funds are consistent with those in the organizational economics literature, in the sense 
that routines and internal practices (instead of pure financial diversification 
considerations) appear to affect global asset allocation. For instance, the existence of 
within-family competition among managers seems to be behind our finding of low 
commonality in portfolio holdings across mutual funds within a given family; namely, 
mutual fund families seem to be organized in a way that makes their own managers 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Kang and Stulz (1997), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2001), and Daude and Fratzscher (2008). 
8 See Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997), Black and Lynch (2001), Bertrand and Schoar (2003), 
Lafontaine and Shaw (2005), and Bloom and van Reenen (2007), among many others. In particular, 
Gibbons and Henderson (2010) argue that differences in performance across firms arise because of 
different management practices, which depend on relational contracts that are not easy to imitate.  
9 See, for example, Griliches and Mairesse (1983), Griliches (1986), Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988), 
Baily, Hulten, Campbell, Bresnahan, and Caves (1992), Cohen and Bacdayan (1994), Henderson and 
Cockburn (1996), Bartelsman and Doms (2000), and Nelson and Winter (2002), among many others.    9 
compete and not talk to each other.
10 Moreover, our evidence that the number of stocks 
held across mutual funds and the portfolio loadings on the top ten holdings are 
significantly explained by family effects, with a limited role for investment mandates, 
suggests that the organization of each company in particular and the financial industry in 
general might be an important factor in determining how financial intermediaries allocate 
their portfolios across countries.
11,12  
A related but separate strand of the literature discusses the role of incentives in 
affecting manager behavior. In particular, the finance literature highlights a misalignment 
between the incentives of managers of financial intermediaries (e.g. banks, hedge funds, 
and mutual funds) and those of the underlying investors, which may lead to long-lasting 
mispricings and cause managers to hold suboptimal portfolios from the investors’ 
perspective.
13 Our paper finds evidence consistent with the view that fund managers do 
not hold optimal international portfolios from the investors’ point of view if a mean-
variance framework is considered, to the extent that the underlying investors hold their 
global allocation through global funds.  
Lastly, we contribute to the literature on the investment patterns of institutional 
investors and mutual funds specifically. Part of this literature has focused on U.S. mutual 
fund domestic investments.
14   Another strand has studied investment patterns of 
institutional investors in emerging markets.
15 By analyzing mutual funds with different 
investment scopes as well as their portfolio choices over relatively long time series, we 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) and Kempf and Ruenzi (2008). In separate work, 
Csaszar (2009) explores how organizational structures affect mutual funds stock-picking behavior.  
11  In related work, Pollet and Wilson (2008) analyze U.S. domestic mutual funds and find that funds 
respond to asset growth by increasing the investments in their current holdings rather than the number of 
holdings in their portfolios (implying higher diversification). Moreover, funds with many siblings diversify 
less rapidly as they grow, suggesting that the fund family may influence a fund’s portfolio strategy. 
12  Though part of the literature has addressed issues related to mutual fund families, it has, however, 
focused on the decisions of the top management of a family and the existence of cross-fund subsidization to 
promote “high value” funds. See, for example, Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004) and Gaspar, Massa, and 
Matos (2006). 
13 Some papers argue that perverse incentives might lead to excessive manager risk taking and sub-optimal 
decisions, whereas others suggest the opposite effect. See Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Bebchuk and Stole 
(1993), Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997, 1999), Dow and Gorton (1997), 
Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2004), Stein (2005), and Rajan (2006), among others. 
14 See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1995), Carhart (1997), Wermers (1999). 
15 See Kang and Stulz (1997), Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999), Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Kim and 
Wei (2002), Edison and Warnock (2004), Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2004), Chan, Covrig, and Ng 
(2005), Gelos and Wei (2005), Broner, Gelos, and Reinhart (2006), among many others.    10 
present new evidence on how mutual funds behave and explore how the organization of 
financial intermediaries can affect the investment decisions they make across countries 
and regions.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 
3 studies how U.S. mutual funds allocate their portfolios internationally. Section 4 
analyzes the factors behind the degree of international diversification. Section 5 studies 
whether there are potential costs and gains to the international diversification strategies of 
global funds. Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Data 
To conduct the analysis, we use data on U.S. equity mutual funds established to purchase 
assets around the world.
16 The U.S. mutual fund industry is very large (in 2005 there 
were 8,044 mutual funds with a market capitalization of US$ 8 trillion, or 69% of U.S. 
GDP), has a strong international presence (according to some estimates, U.S. mutual 
funds represent more than 70% of the assets held worldwide by all mutual funds), 
channels a significant share of retirement savings (mutual funds captured 24% of 
retirement savings in the U.S. in 2004), and is a relatively mature and sophisticated 
industry. We use two types of data: mutual fund holdings and mutual fund returns.  
Mutual fund holdings are available from Morningstar, a company that collects 
mutual fund data. We analyze reports from March 1992 (when they became available) 
until June 2006. While some mutual funds provide monthly reports, most do so quarterly 
or semiannually (depending on the reporting SEC rules at the time). Given this 
heterogeneity in the release of new information, we construct our database with the last 
reported portfolio information for each fund in any given year. For example, our sample 
of mutual fund holdings for 2005 contains portfolio data for the Fidelity Worldwide Fund 
as of October 2005 and portfolio data for the Scudder Global Fund as of December 2005. 
In sum, we collect end-of-year detailed information on portfolio holdings between 1991 
                                                 
16 Funds that focus on both debt and equity are excluded from the analysis, even though they do invest a 
significant share of their portfolios in foreign stocks.    11 
and 2005. We collect stock names, amount invested in each stock by each fund, and 
country of origin of these stocks.
17  
One difficulty in constructing the holdings database is that mutual funds report 
their asset allocation separately over time, that is, their holdings are not linked and do not 
tend to have identifiers across reports. Therefore, each security needs to be identified at 
each point in time. This is not a simple task as stock identifiers are rarely available and, 
when they are, they are not always unique. We match these holdings across mutual funds 
over time based on the country of origin (when available) and the stock name for each 
security holding. We can then determine whether the same stocks appear in different 
mutual fund portfolios across and within fund families.  
Table 1 describes the data. We collect data on 8,420 fund-year portfolio holdings 
over the period 1991 to 2005, covering 499 mutual fund families (companies) and a total 
of 1,904 funds. Each mutual fund family has on average four different mutual funds. 
Some families sell the same portfolio to investors under different names depending on 
their fee structure and minimum investment requirements. In this paper, we consider 
these different funds (with identical portfolios) only once; i.e., we do not treat them as 
separate funds as Morningstar does.
18 The total number of asset-level observations in our 
dataset is 1,359,750, counting each stock-level allocation across all funds over time.  
The U.S. mutual fund industry is organized by splitting funds according to their 
investment scope (Figure 1). In particular, funds are classified into five categories: world 
funds, foreign funds, emerging market funds, regional funds, and country funds. Regional 
funds are divided into: Asia (and Pacific) funds, Europe funds, and Latin America (and 
the Caribbean) funds.
19 World funds invest all over the world including the U.S., while 
foreign funds invest around the world excluding the U.S. Emerging market funds invest 
only in emerging market assets.
20 Regional and country funds invest only in a particular 
                                                 
17 We classify holdings according to the country of origin of the company issuing the stock, independent of 
whether these assets are traded in domestic or international markets.  
18  For example, Fidelity Advisors Funds contain the following Latin America funds with the same 
portfolio: Fidelity Advisors Latin America A, Fidelity Advisors Latin America B, and Fidelity Latin 
America T.  
19 Asia funds can actually invest in countries located in both the Asian and the Pacific regions. Latin 
America funds can also invest in countries in the Caribbean. Some Europe funds also tend to invest in 
countries in Africa, such as South Africa.  
20 Emerging markets are typically middle-income countries. However, these funds might also invest a small 
proportion of their portfolios in low-income countries.    12 
region or country, respectively. For ease of exposition, we group funds into two 
categories: “global funds” and “specialized funds.” Global funds encompass world funds 
and foreign funds. All other fund types are called specialized funds, investing in a subset 
of the assets available to global funds. Naturally, funds with a wider investment scope 
(global funds) are always able to invest in the stocks held by specialized funds, but not 
vice versa. 
We also collect data on the time series of return/price data on mutual funds. Since 
these are open-ended funds, the value of each fund each day reflects the value of their 
underlying holdings or the net asset value (NAV). To be able to compare returns across 
funds within families, we restrict our focus to large families with several types of funds. 
We thus use daily returns at the fund level between September 1989 and June 2006 for 36 
mutual fund families, as reported in Table 1. We work with a total of 722,885 daily 
observations, encompassing all returns for all funds in our sample. We include all funds 
within a given family of funds. On average, each family has ten different mutual funds.
21  
3.  How Do Mutual Funds Allocate Their Portfolios Globally?  
The U.S. mutual fund industry’s activity in international capital markets has expanded 
sharply since the early 1990s. For example, in 1991 there were fewer than 170 mutual 
funds established to invest in international equity, while in 2005 there were almost 700 
funds. While the number of global funds increased steadily until the early 2000s, that of 
specialized funds increased until 1998 and declined since then (Figure 2). This was likely 
driven by the Asian and Russian crises that seem to have generated a desire to hold funds 
that can invest more freely around the world. At the end of 2005, there were 490 global 
funds and 186 specialized funds. In terms of assets under management, the differences 
are even starker. Global (specialized) funds managed US$29 ($7) billion in 1991 and 
US$781 ($160) billion in 2005. This pattern holds across more specific fund types. 
Foreign funds had the most noticeable increase, with assets under management increasing 
from US$10.3 billion to US$540 billion between 1991 and 2005. In sum, the data show a 
                                                 
21 See Appendix Table 1 for a detailed description of the sample coverage of the price data for each mutual 
fund family.    13 
clear trend in the U.S. equity mutual fund industry toward funds with a wider investment 
scope over funds that invest in specific regions or countries. 
Given the increasing importance of global funds, it is natural to ask to what extent 
their portfolios differ from those held by specialized funds and how widespread their 
investments are. We thus explore to what degree mutual fund holdings vary across 
different fund types within mutual fund families. In principle, as the investment scope 
increases, funds should be able to hold more assets across more countries and likely gain 
opportunities to diversify risk better.  
Table 2 presents the average, median, and standard deviation in the number of 
holdings across mutual fund types over the entire 1991-2005 period, pooling all the data. 
The table shows that both global and specialized mutual funds hold a similar number of 
stocks. The median number of holdings for world funds is 106 stocks (76 when excluding 
U.S. assets). The median number of holdings for foreign funds is 105 stocks, while the 
median for emerging market funds is 121 stocks. The medians for Europe and Asia funds 
are 71 and 65 stocks, respectively, while Latin America and country funds hold 56 and 63 
stocks, respectively. These median values are lower for more specialized funds. Overall, 
the number of asset holdings in mutual fund portfolios does not tend to be higher for 
global funds compared to specialized funds, even though the pool of investable assets is 
significantly larger for global funds. In addition, Figure 3 shows the median number of 
holdings for different mutual fund types. The top panel of Figure 3 reports these medians 
for world funds (with and without U.S. holdings), foreign funds, emerging market funds, 
and regional funds. The bottom panel displays the number of stocks held by Asia funds, 
Europe funds, Latin America funds, and country funds. The median number of holdings 
is surprisingly stable over the 15-year period and similar across fund types.
22 Across fund 
categories there is no clear time pattern. In sum, the data suggest that mutual fund 
managers tend to invest in a limited number of stocks that does not increase significantly 
as the investment scope widens.
23  
                                                 
22 Although not shown, the average number of holdings is also stable over time and similar across fund 
types. 
23 This pattern does not seem to be unique to mutual funds investing internationally. When repeating this 
exercise for U.S. mutual funds dedicated to domestic investments and for a popular and broad ETF family 
(iShares), similar patterns arise.    14 
Do global funds hold fewer assets than specialized funds within each region of 
exposure, given that the number of stocks held by global funds does not increase 
significantly relative to specialized funds? The data presented in Table 3 confirm that this 
is indeed the case. For example, the Latin America funds’ median number of assets is 41. 
However, emerging market funds (with a greater investment scope) hold on average 34% 
fewer assets in this region than the Latin America fund within its mutual fund family. The 
difference in the number of holdings is even more striking for global funds, which hold 
93% and 94% less assets in Latin America, respectively for foreign and world funds. 
Furthermore, foreign and world funds also invest, respectively, in 72% and 75% fewer 
countries in Latin America than their specialized counterparts. For Asia, the numbers 
suggest a similar pattern. While the median number of holdings for specialized funds is 
60, the median number of holdings for foreign and world funds is 35 and 19 assets, 
respectively, implying a drop of 42% and 69% relative to the specialized Asian fund 
within the same mutual fund company. If the number of countries is considered, global 
funds also hold assets from significantly fewer countries than Asia funds in the same 
mutual fund family. Lastly, a similar trend is observed when holdings in developed 
Europe are considered: global funds hold fewer assets from fewer countries within 
Europe than specialized funds. 
In sum, as their investment scope becomes broader, mutual funds invest larger 
amounts in fewer stocks and fewer countries within each region of exposure. If asset 
returns were perfectly correlated this behavior would not be surprising, as there would be 
no further diversification gains from holding more assets. Several other reasons could 
also help explain this pattern. These reasons are studied in the rest of the paper. 
4.  What Factors Might Explain the Global Portfolio Allocations?  
To understand the factors behind mutual fund investment practices, we first examine the 
extent to which assets are available for investment and whether mutual funds exhaust 
those investment opportunities. We also analyze whether transaction costs might hinder 
further participation in the markets. We then study the degree of stock commonality 
across funds within families and explore the importance of fund and family effects to 
illustrate how organizational aspects might affect the way in which mutual funds invest.     15 
A.  Asset Availability and Transaction Costs 
A first step to understanding the extent of international diversification by mutual funds is 
to analyze the universe of assets in which they can invest. Table 4 reports the size of the 
universe of stocks in 1997 and 2004.
24 It shows the total number of listed stocks across 
different regions for both developed and developing countries.
25 There were more than 
30,000 listed stocks in 1997 and over 39,000 in 2004.  
Table 4 also reports the actual number of mutual fund holdings and the percent of 
holdings relative to the number of locally listed companies for all funds in our dataset 
(including global funds), and for global funds separately. In 1997, mutual funds invested 
in about 9,000 different firms from around the world. In developed countries, they held 
on average 52% of the listed assets. In developing countries, however, they held only 
13% of the listed stocks. A more pronounced pattern emerges when considering only 
global funds, which have become very large over the sample period. In 1997, global 
funds held 38% (8%) of the number of stocks in developed (developing) economies. 
Table 4 also shows that, although the universe of listed companies has increased 
between 1997 and 2004, there has been a considerable decline in the number of mutual 
fund holdings during this period. This decline has not been concentrated in any particular 
region, but has been more accentuated in developing countries, where a fall of 52% in 
asset holdings across all funds is observed. In developed countries, the number of 
holdings declined 24%. When only global funds are considered, a similar investment 
pattern emerges. By 2004, their holdings had decreased to 26% of the listed assets in 
developed countries. In developing countries, the number of holdings fell approximately 
46% between 1997 and 2004, from 8% to only 3% of the number of listed stocks.  
Although the number of mutual fund holdings fell between 1997 and 2004, the 
amount invested in these stocks grew significantly, in both developed and developing 
countries. Investments in developed countries rose from US$204 billion in 1997 to 
US$446 billion in 2004, a 119% increase. In developing countries, investments also more 
than doubled, increasing from US$30 billion to US$62 billion between 1997 and 2004. 
                                                 
24 Assets from the U.S. are excluded from this table because our focus is on the international holdings of 
mutual funds. Offshore financial centers are also excluded, because while firms typically issue securities in 
these centers, their main operations are located elsewhere.  
25   Developed countries are high-income countries and developing countries (including emerging 
economies) are non-high-income countries, according to the World Bank classification of countries.     16 
Thus, a growing amount of funds is being invested in fewer firms, more significantly so 
in developing countries. 
To complement the evidence that mutual fund investments are concentrated in 
few companies, Figure 4 illustrates how mutual funds invest across countries. The figure 
plots the ratio of the number of companies held in mutual fund portfolios to the total 
number of listed companies. These ratios are computed on a yearly basis and reported 
according to their averages over the 1997-2004 period. Countries are sorted by the extent 
of mutual fund investment and divided in quintiles. Reinforcing the previous evidence, 
this figure shows that mutual fund holdings are not spread evenly across countries. For 
around half of the countries in the sample, mutual funds invest in at most 20% of the 
listed companies. In no country do mutual funds exhaust the number of listed stocks. 
Moreover, only developed countries appear in the highest quintile. Among developing 
countries, Mexico has the highest ratio (44%), and among developed countries, the 
Netherlands has the highest ratio (77%). In the bottom two quintiles, there are 24 
developing countries but only four developed countries. 
Another possible explanation for the restricted number of holdings of mutual 
funds is transaction costs. First, transaction costs could be an impediment to expand the 
number stocks in mutual fund portfolios since not all listed stocks could be bought at a 
low cost. However, cross-fund comparisons suggest that transaction costs do not present 
a strong binding constraint. In particular, the fact that one fund holds a certain stock is an 
indication that there are no clear investment restrictions related to that company. The 
evidence presented in Table 3 suggests that, for example, global funds could indeed 
expand the range of their investments by simply investing in the same stocks that 
specialized funds hold. Second, mutual funds could be relatively large. For instance, if 
specialized funds held a large fraction of the available shares, global funds would find it 
difficult to invest in those stocks without affecting prices.  
To investigate whether there are restrictions coming from the supply side of 
investments, Table 5 reports the size of individual mutual fund holdings relative to firms’ 
market capitalization. The table shows that, on average, mutual funds hold a very small 
fraction of market capitalization: both global funds and specialized funds account each    17 
for 0.12% of firms’ market capitalization.
26 Consequently, if funds wanted to increase the 
exposure to their current holdings, they could probably do so without generating a 
significant price impact. Furthermore, the patterns observed regarding mutual fund 
holdings do not seem to be driven by the inability of global funds to hold more stocks 
across countries either. For example, if specialized funds were to increase in size by $900 
million (the average global fund size), their investments on average would only account 
for 0.53% of firms’ market capitalization. In sum, neither the lack of available assets nor 
transaction costs seem to present strong binding constraints to the portfolio choices of 
mutual funds to the extent that mutual funds could increase their current exposures and 
expand the range of assets they hold without incurring in high costs. 
B.  Stock Commonality 
Next, we analyze the degree to which funds within families invest in similar stocks to 
shed light on whether information is shared. To the extent that information is costly to 
obtain and process and the managers of specialized funds have already decided on an 
asset allocation and have specific information about their particular countries or regions, 
global fund managers within the same mutual fund family could benefit from this 
information and choose among the stocks selected by their peers. In other words, if global 
and specialized funds within mutual fund families shared information and made similar 
decisions, one should observe similar portfolios across them. From the evidence 
presented above on the number of holdings across fund types, we already know that 
global funds are not holding the same portfolios than specialized funds (they hold fewer 
stocks within each region), but we do not know whether the stocks picked are actually the 
same, i.e. a subset of those held by specialized funds. It is also possible that portfolio 
holdings are not similar across funds within families, which would be the case if 
managers competed with each other, with each manager gathering its own information.  
To assess the portfolio similarity, and hence information sharing across funds 
within mutual fund families, we ask: what is the likelihood that, within a fund family, a 
stock held by a specialized fund is also held by a global fund? The within-family 
comparison is important given the large heterogeneity in holdings across mutual fund 
                                                 
26 The number for global funds and specialized funds is similar because, although global funds are larger 
than specialized funds, they tend to invest in larger firms in terms of market capitalization.    18 
families (documented in the next sub-section) and the hypothesis of interest, that is, 
whether fund managers in the same company make similar decisions as a sign of 
information sharing.  
We first compute frequency counts to study the degree of commonality. We 
consider global and specialized funds within a mutual fund family and count the number 
of observations for which a stock is held by either one of these two fund types, with each 
of the almost 400,000 observations being a family-year-stock observation. Then we 
compute the fraction of the observations in which a stock is held (a) by one fund type but 
not the other, (b) by both fund types, and (c) by the global fund when there is no 
specialized fund within the same family that could hold that stock.
27 We  make these 
comparisons on a yearly basis; for example, we compare a stock held by a specialized 
fund at time t with the stocks held by the corresponding global fund also at time t. By 
construction, no observation falls into the case in which there is no global fund that could 
not hold a stock held by a specialized fund; that is, for every specialized fund there is 
always a global fund within the mutual fund family.
28 Also by construction there are no 
observations for which a stock is held by neither the global fund nor the specialized fund. 
We repeat this exercise considering only holdings in developing countries and breaking 
global funds into world funds and foreign funds.  
The results are shown in Table 6 for all holdings in the top panel and for holdings 
in developing countries only in the bottom panel. Each cell represents the relative 
frequency of the observations, that is, the joint probability that global and specialized 
funds hold/do not hold a particular stock. Conditional probabilities can be obtained by 
looking at a particular row or column. The evidence from Table 6 suggests that global 
funds and specialized funds do not hold many stocks in common. When considering all 
holdings, only 16% of actual holdings are shared by both fund types; in developing 
countries, that fraction is 13%. Importantly, only 23% of the global fund holdings are 
shared by specialized funds. Moreover, 32% of the stocks are held by specialized funds 
alone but not by global funds. The results from Table 6 (bottom panel) also suggest that 
most of the mutual fund holdings in developing countries are explained by holdings of 
                                                 
27 U.S. assets are excluded from this analysis. 
28 We exclude all family-year-stock observations for which mutual fund families do not have one of the 
fund types considered in that given year.    19 
specialized funds. For example, 75% of the stocks held by mutual funds are held by 
specialized funds but not by global funds. In other words, a mere 25% of the stocks in 
developing countries in our sample are held by global funds. Furthermore, conditional on 
being held by a specialized fund, there is only a 15% probability that a stock from a 
developing country is held by a global fund. In sum, relative to specialized funds, global 
funds seem to be investing in a different set of firms.
29  
The frequency counts shown in Table 6 and Appendix Table 2 measure to what 
extent mutual funds with different investment scopes hold assets from the same 
companies. However, that evidence does not take into account the size of mutual fund 
investments in each stock. It might be possible that, though the range of stocks in which 
mutual funds invest differs, global and specialized mutual fund portfolios contain a large 
loading on common stocks. Therefore, mutual fund portfolios could actually be more 
similar than they appear from the evidence above. The reverse could also be true.  
To account for the size of mutual fund investment in each stock, we study entropy 
or similarity measures that analyze how alike mutual fund investments (measured by the 
NAV) actually are. The entropy measure is constructed as follows:  
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where         , 
 ,  is measured for all funds within types i and j for each family f at time 
t;  ,     global fund, specialized fund ; s are stocks common to the portfolio of both 
funds i and j from family f at time t. The measure is calculated for every family in every 
year. Moreover, this measure is constructed within families, given our focus on 
commonality in portfolios across mutual funds within mutual fund companies. As above, 
global funds are then split into world funds and foreign funds. For a given pair of 
different fund types within the same mutual fund family, the entropy measure is the ratio 
of the sum of the dollar investment in stocks common to the portfolio of these two fund 
types over the total net assets of the same funds. This entropy measure can be regarded as 
                                                 
29  Appendix Table 2 splits global funds into world funds and foreign funds and compares them with 
specialized funds. The results suggest that there is no significant difference in portfolio holdings across 
global funds: specialized funds invest in a wider set of assets than both world funds and foreign funds. 
World funds and specialized funds share only 10% of their holdings. This percentage increases to 15% 
when foreign funds are considered.    20 
an upper bound of commonality since it compares global funds to aggregates of all 
specialized funds within families. If global funds were to be compared separately to each 
specialized fund, the entropy measure for each of these comparisons would cover only a 
fraction of the portfolio holdings of global funds and, thus, would tend to be lower than 
the one used here.  
The entropy measure indicates that mutual funds do indeed hold a more similar 
portfolio than what the frequency counts suggest. However, mutual funds still invest in 
quite different portfolios. For example, when comparing global and specialized funds, the 
entropy measure shows that, on average, 36% of the value of their holdings is in common 
assets. In contrast, according to Table 6, only 16% of the number of their holdings is in 
the same stocks. The entropy measure is slightly higher in the case of developing 
countries, reaching on average 42%, compared to the 13% obtained for the frequency 
count in Table 6. As shown in Figure 5, the entropy measure is stable over the sample 
period, and, if anything, it decreases since 2001 (and since 1999 for the case of 
developing countries), suggesting that there is no rise in commonality over time. Similar 
patterns are obtained (in unreported results) when splitting global funds by type. Over the 
entire sample period, the median entropy measure is 26% when comparing the holdings 
of world funds and specialized funds and 28% when comparing those of foreign funds 
and specialized funds. 
Interestingly, the commonality measures increase with the number of common 
managers across funds within mutual fund families. Figure 6 shows that, as the number of 
common managers increases, the entropy measures increase. For example, the median 
entropy for funds with no common managers is 29%, while the median entropy for 
family-years with at least one common manger across different funds is 43%, and the one 
with more than three common managers is 65%. Furthermore, Table 7 shows that the 
number of common managers is statistically significant in explaining the entropy 
measures, independent of whether all holdings or only holdings in developing countries 
are considered. As the number of common managers increases, so does the degree of 
commonality. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that lack of information at the mutual fund family 
level alone does not seem to explain the apparent lack of international diversification.    21 
The evidence that mutual funds do not tend to hold portfolios that are very similar 
suggests that managers do not use the information already gathered and processed by 
other managers within the same mutual fund family, even though the family itself has 
already incurred the cost of acquiring the information. In other words, similar portfolios 
would provide evidence consistent with information sharing, which we do not find. 
Moreover, we find that when managers participate in the portfolio allocation decision of 
more than one fund in the same family, the portfolios of those funds tend to be more 
similar. This evidence suggests that managers within families might be actually 
competing with each other, gathering costly information and picking stocks 
independently.
30 Namely, industrial organizational aspects of the mutual fund industry 
that make managers compete could at least partly explain the restrictive investment 
patterns we find in the data. Competition among managers might also explain the 
evidence documented above on the limited number of assets in mutual fund portfolios, 
independent of their investment scope. To the extent that managers within families gather 
and process information independently and have similar capacity, they would tend to 
handle a similar number of stocks. These factors, however, do not explain the variability 
across families, which we explore next.  
C.  Family Effects 
Next, we analyze the role of family effects, beyond fundamentals, in explaining portfolio 
choices. We do so following the organizational literature, which emphasizes the 
importance of firm effects (as opposed to plant effects within firms) to understand 
corporate behavior. Much of this research (e.g., Henderson and Cockburn, 1994 and 
Klette, 1999) characterizes the existence of these firm effects (family effects in this 
paper) through firm-level dummies and measures their relevance by the increase in the R-
squared of the regressions. Analogously, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) follow this 
methodology to analyze the impact of managerial effects on corporate policies and 
performance. We pursue a similar empirical strategy here. 
Before presenting formal empirical evidence, we discuss some simple statistics. 
While, as mentioned above, the median number of holdings across all fund-year 
                                                 
30 This finding is consistent with the evidence shown by Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) on the existence of a 
family tournament, i.e. competition among managers within mutual fund families.    22 
observation is 95 stocks, there is significant dispersion, with some funds holding many 
stocks in some years. For instance, as shown in Figure 7 (top panel), while 73% of the 
observations imply holdings below 150 stocks, 9% of the observations represent holdings 
of more than 350 stocks. Furthermore, this dispersion in the number of stocks found in 
the fund-year observations is linked to the variance in the number of stocks held across 
mutual fund families. In fact, mutual fund families differ substantially in the number of 
stocks they hold. For example, GAM Funds and Oppenheimer Funds hold on average 
substantially fewer than 200 stocks, while others (such as Dreyfus Founders and 
Vanguard Group) hold about two times more. More thoroughly, the bottom panel of 
Figure 7 shows the median number of stocks per family, sorted from the lowest to the 
highest number of holdings. The mean of the first quintile of the distribution is 39 stocks, 
whereas the mean of the fifth quintile is 335. While there are extreme cases, with the 
median fund in one family holding 1,094 stocks, most families hold a limited number of 
stocks, with the mean of the fourth quintile being 122 stocks. 
We next test more formally the importance of family effects in explaining both 
the number of stock holdings (a measure of how widely spread the portfolio is) and, 
alternatively, the portfolio loadings on the top ten holdings (a measure of portfolio 
concentration). The top panel of Table 8 reports regressions of the number of holdings 
(the dependent variable) on year, fund type, and family dummies. Similarly, the bottom 
panel of Table 8 reports these regressions with the percentage of net assets in the top ten 
holdings as our dependent variable. The dummy coefficients are not reported, although 
they are usually significant at the standard confidence levels. Seven different 
specifications are reported. In the first specification, only year dummies are included. In 
this case, less than 1% of the variance in mutual fund holdings or top ten holdings can be 
explained. Column 2 reports a regression with fund type dummies alone. Again, a small 
percentage (only 2%) of the variance of the number of mutual fund holdings is explained 
by these dummies. Fund type dummies explain a slightly higher, albeit still small, 
percentage (11%) of the variation in the top ten holdings across fund-year observations. 
The specification in column 3 includes family dummies. In this case, 46% of the variance 
in the number of holdings and 36% of the variance of top ten holdings across funds and 
over time are explained by these dummies, much greater percentages than those    23 
explained by fund type and year effects alone. The following three reported regressions 
include a combination of these three types of dummies: family dummies, fund type 
dummies, and year dummies. In all these cases, the R-squared is relatively high only 
when family dummies are included. Lastly, we report a specification with all dummies 
together (column 7). We observe only a slight increase in the R-squared in comparison to 
the other regressions with family dummies. Therefore, family effects indeed seem 
relevant to explain the portfolio decisions of mutual funds, affecting not only the number 
of stock holdings but also the allocation in the top holdings. 
The importance of family effects raises the immediate question of what factors 
might be behind the observed patterns. To shed light on these family effects and in line 
with the organizational literature, we estimate similar regressions controlling for other 
variables believed to “fundamentally” affect the portfolio choices of mutual funds. In 
particular, we explore the relevance of family-level and fund-level variables. We relate 
the number of stock holdings and loadings on the top ten stocks to (i) the ability of funds 
to gather and process information within families (proxied by the number of managers, 
family expenses, and family size), (ii) variables related to the characteristics of funds and 
their managers that could also affect portfolio decisions (fund age, manager tenure, and 
fund type fixed effects), and (iii) family effects themselves, which capture any remaining 
attribute or practice at the family level. The first set of variables directly captures the 
extent to which costly information is a binding factor in driving portfolio decisions. The 
second set of variables is motivated by our findings in the previous sub-section on the 
relation of the commonality of portfolios and managers. As highlighted by Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003), managers themselves (through their investment “styles” for example) can 
play an important role in explaining corporate behavior.  
The results are shown in Table 9, columns 1 to 5 for the number of stock holdings 
as the dependent variable and columns 6-10 for the percentage of net assets in the top ten 
holdings.
31 Column 1 shows that the number of stocks is positively associated with the 
number of managers; however, the marginal effect is low. For example, funds with one 
manager hold on average 133 stocks, while funds with two managers hold 135 stocks, 
                                                 
31 Appendix Table 3 reports regressions with fund-level variables, instead of family-level ones, to capture 
funds’ ability to gather and process information. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones presented 
here.    24 
and funds with six managers hold 197 stocks. The number of managers has similar 
effects on the loadings on the top ten holdings, as shown in column 6. That is, there is a 
significant negative correlation (less portfolio concentration) but small marginal effects to 
additional managers. In all other specifications, the number of managers enters as a single 
count variable. In columns 2 and 3, the regressions do not include family dummies but 
incorporate fund-level variables (the count variable on the number of managers, manager 
tenure, fund age, and fund type dummies) and family-level ones (family expenses and 
family size). The number of managers and family size are positively associated with the 
number of holdings, while expenses at the family level show a negative correlation. 
Although statistically significant, they explain only a small proportion of the variance of 
the number of stocks held by mutual funds, between 2% and 7% versus 46% explained 
by family dummies alone (as reported in the top panel of Table 8, column 3). Regarding 
the top ten holdings, reported in columns 7 and 8, fund-level characteristics are 
statistically significant: the count variable on the number of managers and fund age show 
a negative correlation with the percentage of net assets in the top ten holdings. However, 
similar to the findings on the number of portfolio holdings, these variables only explain 
about one third of what family dummies alone do (bottom panel of Table 8, column 3). In 
other words, although variables that capture the capacity of funds to gather and process 
information within families and variables related to the characteristics of funds and their 
managers that could affect portfolio decision are related to the portfolio choices of mutual 
funds, they only explain a fraction of what family dummies do. In fact, when family 
dummies are included in these regressions (last two specifications reported in Table 9), 
not only the R-squared increases significantly, but many of these fund-level and other 
family-level variables become statistically insignificant. 
In sum, the results presented in Section 4 suggest that the apparent lack of 
international diversification in mutual fund portfolios cannot be explained by the lack of 
available instruments or information at the family level or by transaction costs. Instead, 
organizational factors seem important in explaining mutual fund international 
investments. In particular, funds do not appear to share information within families, 
especially if they have different managers. In fact, the evidence is consistent with 
managers within families competing with each other, which might partly explain the    25 
limited number of stocks across funds and the similarity in the number of holdings across 
funds with different investment scopes. Family effects are also an important driver of 
mutual fund portfolio choices, even after controlling for fund-specific and family-specific 
characteristics related to the ability to gather and process information and select 
portfolios. These family effects are likely to capture practices or norms by different 
mutual fund companies, which affect the incentives faced by the managers of each 
individual fund and eventually the portfolios they choose.  
5.  Returns to Diversification 
We now analyze mutual fund returns to shed light on whether they can explain why 
global funds do not have a substantially larger number of holdings relative to specialized 
funds. The fact that global funds tend to hold fewer stocks in fewer countries within 
regions of exposure (compared to specialized funds in the same mutual fund family) 
might be explained by the lack of extra diversification gains (due to correlated returns) 
and/or by the desire of investors to minimize tail risk. We thus study if there are potential 
gains from further international diversification by global funds. We also test whether 
benchmark effects can justify the portfolio choice of global funds, since managers are 
generally evaluated on their performance relative to benchmark indexes. Finally, we 
investigate the existence of an insurance premium in the returns of global funds.  
A.  Standard Portfolio Model: Mean-Variance Analysis 
To evaluate the potential cost of the apparent lack of diversification by global funds, we 
compare the returns of global funds to those of “simulated global funds.” We construct 
one simulated global fund for each actual global fund, consisting of a portfolio of 
specialized funds (that belong to the same mutual fund family as the global fund) and the 
global fund itself. This is analogous to letting a global fund invest in a portfolio that 
replicates specialized fund holdings at any point in time. The portfolio weights on the 
specialized funds and the global fund itself, which define the simulated global fund, are 
obtained through mean-variance optimizations. The returns of the simulated global funds 
are compared to the returns of the actual global funds over the same period. This is a 
conservative exercise to evaluate the gains from international diversification since it does 
not use all stocks in the investment universe of global funds to construct alternative    26 
portfolios (which might include assets that are hard to reach, but could apparently yield 
substantially higher risk-adjusted returns); it only uses the stocks already chosen by 
specialized funds within the same family. 
There is an important advantage in constructing these simulated global funds at 
the family level. The fact that at least one specialized fund is already holding an asset is 
an indication that they are within the subset of investable assets. That is, there are no 
clear restrictions to investing in those assets, so transaction costs should not be very high. 
Moreover, the fact that a specialized fund within the mutual fund family is investing in a 
stock is an indication that the mutual fund company has already paid for the potential 
costs of collecting and processing information related to that stock.  
To perform the mean-variance analysis, consider that there is a global fund with 
an observed return history G, and there are also several specialized funds within the 
mutual fund family of the global fund with observed returns  i S . The global fund can 
invest anywhere in the world, including the assets held by specialized funds (with the 
exception of the U.S., if the global fund is a foreign fund), whereas specialized funds 
invest in specific regions.
32 The simulated global fund is constructed as a portfolio P that 
assigns non-negative weights to all specialized funds and to the global fund itself. This 
within mutual fund family exercise is isomorphic to allowing a global fund to invest in 
specialized funds within its mutual fund family. This portfolio P is constructed such that 
it optimally maximizes risk-adjusted returns by either (i) minimizing its own variance and 
achieving at least the same expected return as the global fund itself or (ii) maximizing its 
expected returns conditional on not increasing return volatility (relative to the actual 
global fund).  
In other words, we impose the following restrictions to construct the simulated 
global funds: (i) portfolios are constructed for each global fund using a combination of 
the fund itself and specialized funds within the same mutual fund family; (ii) only buy 
and hold strategies are considered (funds cannot be shorted); (iii) the performance 
evaluation is always conducted out-of-sample; (iv) the portfolio is optimized on a daily or 
weekly basis; and (v) a mean-variance framework is used.  
                                                 
32 In the families analyzed here, there are no specialized funds with holdings exclusively in the U.S.    27 
The first optimization problem is set to minimize the variance of the returns of the 
simulated global fund, keeping the returns of the simulated global fund at least as large as 
those of the actual global fund. The exercise can be described as follows:  
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where xi is the portfolio weight on the specialized fund i within the mutual fund family of 
the global fund and ∑ in (2) is the covariance matrix of all mutual fund returns within the 
same family. Since the simulated global fund P is evaluated out-of-sample, the portfolio 
shares are computed at time t using all available information up to that time, and held for 
the next period, when the return of P is computed. We are then able to compare the return 
of the simulated global fund P with the return of the global fund G over the same time 
period. Portfolio weights are actively re-optimized every period. 
As an alternative exercise, we maximize expected returns, keeping the variance of 
the simulated global fund at most as large as that of the global fund itself. This strategy 
can be described as follows: 
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We perform these two exercises for several types of global funds: world funds, 
foreign funds, or pools of world or foreign funds. Pools of world (or foreign) funds exist 
when more than one fund in a mutual fund family is classified as a world (or foreign)    28 
fund and these funds have different objectives such as value, growth, or blend strategies. 
An important benefit of the exercises performed here is that they do not need to identify 
the exact stocks held by different mutual funds within a mutual fund family at every point 
in time. The only information needed is mutual fund returns over time and the investment 
scope. This allows us to extend the time horizon of the data to start in the late 1980s.  
The summary statistics of the simulated and actual global funds are shown in two 
tables. Table 10 reports the results for simulated global funds constructed with the largest 
number of available specialized funds (the largest cross-section), called the “largest 
number of funds” simulation. This simulation includes all possible specialized funds for 
each family and adjusts the time series accordingly to use the sample available for all 
funds included in the simulation; however, it does not necessarily entail a very long time 
span due to data availability on mutual fund returns. Table 11 reports results that use 
instead only specialized funds that allow for estimations of simulated global funds with 
relatively long time series, called the “longest available sample” simulation. In particular, 
specialized funds are excluded from the simulations if they reduce the sample size by at 
least six months. Naturally, this longer time series come at the cost of having fewer 
specialized funds in the comparisons. On average, three specialized funds are excluded 
from these simulations if compared to the largest number of funds simulations, which 
leads to an increase on average of 44 months in the time span of the simulations. 
Tables 10 and 11 present the following statistics based on daily and weekly data: 
the average annualized returns of the actual global funds and the simulated global funds, 
the average annualized difference in accumulated returns between each simulated global 
fund and the corresponding global fund, the standard deviation of returns, and the number 
of comparisons.
33 Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the 
entire sample for each simulation. Averages across simulations are then computed.
34 The 
tables report separately statistics for world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or 
foreign funds. Results are presented using daily and weekly (Wednesday) returns. 
                                                 
33 We also compute these tables at the family level to show the heterogeneity across mutual fund families. 
The results are reported in Appendix Tables 4A and 4B for the largest number of funds simulations, and in 
Appendix Tables 5A and 5B for the longest available sample simulations.  
34 Though not reported, for robustness purposes we also calculated these return differences at every point in 
time and then computed the averages within and across simulations. The results are qualitatively similar to 
those reported here.      29 
The top panels of Tables 10 and 11 report results based on minimizing variances 
using equation (2). Table 10 shows that simulated global funds yield on average 
annualized excess returns of 485 basis points per year relative to world funds, 403 basis 
points relative to foreign funds, and 455 basis points relative to the pool of world or 
foreign funds. Moreover, the daily standard deviations of the returns of the simulated 
global funds are also smaller than those of the global funds. For example, Table 10 shows 
that the standard deviation falls by eight basis points for world and foreign funds and 
seven basis points for the pool of world or foreign funds. The numbers might seem small, 
but they are reductions in the daily standard deviation of returns. The results hold when 
using weekly returns. For example, Table 10 shows that the simulated global funds yield 
on average 436 basis points more per year than actual global funds when considering all 
types of global funds. These increases in risk-adjusted expected returns suggest that there 
are potential gains from further international diversification for global funds, even if 
investing only in stocks held by other funds within the same mutual fund family. 
Table 11 shows that the results are similar when using the simulations with the 
longest time span. For example, the average improvement in returns is 295 basis points 
per year and the improvement in the daily standard deviation of returns is seven basis 
points. The differences are smaller than the ones reported in Table 10 because fewer 
specialized funds are available when the longest available sample simulations are 
considered. In other words, there is less scope for improvement than in the previous case. 
Similar patterns arise for simulations based on weekly returns. 
The bottom panels of Tables 10 and 11 report summary statistics of portfolios 
constructed based on maximizing expected returns while holding the variance constant, 
using equation (3). When considering the simulations with the greater number of 
specialized funds (Table 10), the improvement in annualized daily returns is 434 basis 
points for all types of global funds, whereas the daily standard deviation falls by five 
basis points. If the longest available sample simulations are considered, Table 11 shows 
that the improvement in daily returns is 302 basis points and the improvement in the daily 
standard deviation of returns is six basis points.
  When using weekly returns, larger 
differences are obtained; the improvement in returns are 552 and 355 basis points for the 
largest number of funds and the longest available sample simulations, respectively.    30 
In sum, the results from these simulations suggest that one can reject the 
hypothesis that there are no gains from further international diversification by holding 
more stocks within and across countries. In other words, the investment practices 
documented in the first part of the paper seem indeed to be restrictive. Although there is 
some heterogeneity in the results depending on the strategy used, the simulated global 
funds consistently yield higher returns and no greater volatility than the actual global 
funds, even when comparing funds within the same families.
35,36  
B.  Benchmarking through a Tracking-Error Model 
Next we consider a different optimization strategy since the objective of most mutual 
funds is not necessarily to minimize the variance given some expected return, or to 
maximize returns given some variance. In particular, the performance of mutual funds 
might actually be evaluated in comparison to benchmark indexes. Moreover, managers 
might be compensated according to this relative performance. Thus, portfolio decisions 
should incorporate these managerial incentives. Furthermore, different mutual funds 
might follow different investment goals. It is possible that some mutual funds follow 
more passively benchmark indexes while others are more active in seeking returns. 
Therefore, the difference in returns between the actual global funds and the simulated 
global funds could, in principle, be explained by different investment practices across 
global and specialized funds. We address these two related issues in this sub-section. 
We first test whether benchmark effects are important in explaining the gains 
from further international diversification found in the previous exercise. For the case of 
the variance minimization, we modify the objective function to take into consideration a 
benchmark index.
37 The benchmark is the appropriate MSCI index (B), specific for each 
global fund as described in the Morningstar database or in the fund’s website. Instead of 
minimizing the variance of the portfolio, we minimize the variance of the difference 
                                                 
35  For robustness, we also perform these simulations with a more restricted sample. We use rolling 
windows of 240 business days. The results are robust to this change and are reported in Appendix Tables 
6A and 6B. 
36 These results are not driven by significant changes in the weights of the simulated global funds over 
time. The time series of the portfolio weights change smoothly and the simulated portfolios do not require 
large shifts in holdings, which could entail large transaction costs.  
37 This is analogous to what others in the literature do. See, for example, Roll (1992) and Chan, Karceski, 
and Lakonishok (1999).    31 
between the portfolio and the benchmark index. Thus, while the constraints for the 
minimization problem (2) remain the same, the following equation is now used:  
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For the maximization of expected returns, we replace the restriction on the 
variance of the simulated global fund. We impose that the variance of the difference 
between the simulated global fund and the benchmark index has to be at most the same as 
the variance of the difference between the global fund and the benchmark index. Thus,  
                                                            var        v a r       .                                    5  
The results of these new simulations based on daily data are reported in Table 12 
for the largest number of funds simulations, and in Table 13 for the longest sample 
available simulations. For simulations that minimize the variance of the portfolio, the 
results are similar to the ones reported in the previous section. For the largest number of 
funds simulations reported in the top panel of Table 12, the simulated global funds 
generate excess annualized returns of 343, 379, and 420 basis points when compared to 
world funds, foreign funds, and the pool of world or foreign funds, respectively. 
Improvements in the standard deviation are also observed. On average, the daily standard 
deviation falls five basis points. When the longest available sample simulations are 
considered, as reported in the top panel of Table 13, the results hold. Simulated global 
funds yield, on average, an excess annualized expected return of 282 basis points across 
the different simulations, and a daily standard deviation five basis points lower than 
global funds. When maximizing expected returns, the results are even stronger. Table 12 
shows an improvement on average of 402 basis points in annualized daily returns across 
mutual fund families and of seven basis points in daily standard deviations. In Table 13, 
where fewer specialized funds are included in the portfolio simulations, the improvement 
in returns is 322 basis points, but reaches 494 basis points for the pool of world or foreign 
funds. The improvement in daily standard deviations is also large: eight basis points on 
average across mutual fund families. In sum, our results suggest that benchmark effects 
cannot explain the empirical evidence described above regarding the investment patterns 
of mutual funds. We find that, even within the same mutual fund family and accounting 
for benchmarking, global funds could obtain improvements in both risk and returns by 
further international diversification.    32 
To study whether global and specialized funds follow different types of 
investment strategies and are thus differently active, we compute entropy measures over 
time. That is, we calculate the similarity of mutual fund portfolios between any two 
consecutive years of mutual fund holdings. Importantly, we compute separate measures 
for each individual fund and then obtain medians for world funds, foreign funds, and 
specialized funds. The median entropy over time is 0.63, 0.65, and 0.66 for world funds, 
foreign funds, and specialized funds, respectively. Figure 8 shows that these measures are 
very stable over time and are not statistically different from each other, suggesting that 
stock turnover is not different across funds with different investment scopes. Similar 
results are obtained when considering only holdings in developing economies, as shown 
in the bottom panel of Figure 8. These results suggest that different types of funds do not 
have significantly different trading strategies since their portfolios behave similarly over 
time. 
C.  Insurance Premium in the Global Fund Returns 
Another possible explanation for our results is the existence of an insurance premium in 
the returns of global funds, not explicitly captured in our mean-variance analysis. Global 
funds have the ability to shift their stock holdings across countries and regions, which is 
not an option for specialized funds. Thus, investors might be willing to pay for this extra 
flexibility by requiring lower risk-adjusted returns from global funds, since they might 
yield gains during turbulent times. In other words, global funds might be better suited 
than specialized funds to avoid large losses due to their ability to move away from 
troubled countries. We therefore evaluate whether global funds have indeed a better 
ability to minimize losses relative to specialized funds by comparing the returns of global 
funds and simulated global funds (composed of both global funds themselves and 
specialized funds). 
We first analyze higher moments of the distribution of returns, which would be 
important if global funds were to minimize losses during bad times instead of following a 
standard mean-variance approach. In particular, we compare the skewness and kurtosis of 
global fund returns to those of simulated global fund returns obtained from the mean-
variance exercise. The results based on daily data are reported in Table 14 for the largest 
number of funds simulations and Table 15 for the longest available sample simulations.    33 
We find that skewness and kurtosis of returns are similar between global and simulated 
global funds. For example, according to the largest number of funds (longest time series) 
simulations, the skewness of global fund returns is -0.69 (-0.81) whereas that of the 
simulated global funds is -0.84 (-0.94) or -0.70 (-0.74), depending on whether the 
variance is minimized or expected returns are maximized. The kurtosis of global funds is 
10.69 for the largest number of funds simulation and 12.85 for the longest available 
sample simulation. The kurtosis of the simulated global funds is 10.04 (11.96) when the 
variance is minimized and 7.74 (8.60) when expected returns are maximized, using the 
largest number of funds (longest available sample) simulations. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that, despite the differences in the mean and variances reported above, higher 
moments of the distribution of returns are not considerably different across global funds 
and simulated global funds. If anything, the kurtosis estimates are lower for the simulated 
global funds than for global funds, indicating that global funds do not appear to be robust 
portfolios as their distribution of returns has fatter tails.  
We now consider the ability of global funds to move away from turbulence-hit 
countries or regions, and thus actually avoid realized risks. Given the limited information 
on portfolio holdings at a high frequency, we focus the analysis on the incidence of 
negative returns during turbulent times. For instance, conditional on large negative 
returns on the MSCI Emerging Market Index (our proxy for turmoil periods), we 
compare the realized returns of both actual global funds and simulated global funds.
 38 
The results reported in Table 16 show that their performances are typically not 
statistically different from each other.
 For example, the average return of global funds is  
-3.42% per week (p.w.) when the MSCI Emerging Market Index falls more than 10% in 
one week, while the average return of the simulated global funds is -3.45% (-3.70%) p.w. 
when minimizing the variance (maximizing expected returns) for the largest number of 
funds. Therefore, global funds do not seem to avoid large losses if compared to 
specialized funds.
39 
                                                 
38 The evidence reported here considers only weekly returns. The results are similar if monthly returns are 
analyzed. Results are available upon request. 
39 A shift of the simulated global funds towards actual global funds and away from specialized funds does 
not seem to be driving these results. Portfolio weights on actual global funds are generally stable in periods 
in which the MSCI Emerging Market Index falls significantly. Moreover, this stability in portfolio weights    34 
As an alternative, Table 17 shows the return differentials conditional on periods in 
which the simulated global funds perform poorly. In these situations, global funds yield 
slightly higher weekly returns, with differentials between 0.14% and 0.95% p.w., 
although these return differentials are not always statistically different from zero. Table 
18 reports the results of a similar exercise that focuses on periods when global funds do 
not perform well. In this case, the simulated global funds perform significantly better 
than global funds. For example, when the return of global funds is less than 10% in one 
week, the simulated global funds yield an extra 2.65% p.w. when maximizing the 
expected return with the largest number of funds. If the longest available sample for 
variance minimization is considered, the difference in returns is 1.88% p.w. 
6.  Conclusions 
Using a novel micro dataset of portfolio holdings of U.S. mutual funds, this paper studies 
how institutional investors diversify their portfolios across countries. This dataset allows 
us to analyze important aspects of international asset allocation, documenting new 
stylized facts and shedding new light on existing explanations of international portfolio 
allocation. In particular, we take advantage of the fact that mutual funds belong to 
families, each having several funds with different scopes for international investment. As 
the investment scope broadens, one would expect funds to hold more securities and to be 
better diversified internationally, to the extent that asset returns are not perfectly 
correlated. This feature of the mutual fund industry enables us to study to what extent 
organizational aspects and other factors are important for international asset allocation 
and whether the investment practices exploit the potential gains from international 
diversification. 
We find that global funds have expanded substantially, giving investors more 
options to diversify risk internationally. However, regardless of their investment scope, 
mutual funds tend to invest in a relatively small number of countries and firms, in about 
100 stocks. In fact, as their investment possibilities widen, mutual funds invest in fewer 
stocks and fewer countries within each region of exposure. Consistently, the number of 
                                                                                                                                                 
also suggests that such a portfolio shift is not behind the evidence related to the higher moments of the 
return distribution.    35 
stock holdings is similar across funds within mutual fund families. However, there is 
significant variability in the number of holdings across families. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results in this paper. First, the results 
suggest that the restrictive investment practices of mutual funds are not driven by 
instrument availability or transaction costs, broadly understood as barriers to purchase 
securities. Mutual funds purchase only a very small fraction of the instruments available 
for investment. Moreover, specialized funds have already invested in a set of assets, 
which are also available to global funds, indicating that there are no clear restrictions to 
purchase them. Furthermore, neither specialized nor global fund holdings are very large 
relative to market capitalization. Therefore, the pattern of investment in few firms does 
not seem to be driven by fund size and funds might be able to expand their exposures, 
probably without incurring major trading costs.  
Second, the evidence in this paper highlights the importance of organizational 
aspects to explain the investment choices of institutional investors and does not seem 
consistent with the idea that asset allocation is driven by lack of information at the family 
level. These organizational aspects seem to induce competition among managers within 
the same family and affect portfolio choices across funds. In particular, since we compare 
the potential diversification gains of investing in assets already held within the mutual 
fund family, one can argue that the cost of gathering and processing information has 
already been paid by someone in the family and that other mutual fund managers within 
the family could in principle access that information. However, the portfolios of mutual 
funds within families investing in the same region do not appear to be very similar, even 
though their similarity increases when funds share asset managers. Furthermore, there are 
strong family effects behind mutual fund investment practices; that is, the number of 
stocks held across fund types and the portfolio loadings are similar within mutual fund 
companies but different across them. These family effects are much more important than 
other factors (such as the number of managers working in the fund, fund age, manager 
tenure, expenses at the fund and family level, and fund or family size) considered to 
affect both the ease of gathering and processing information and portfolio allocations 
themselves.     36 
Third, the investment practices documented in this paper entail a cost in the sense 
that, according to a mean-variance framework, there are large potential gains from further 
international diversification. Global funds could gain substantially from further 
international diversification in risk-adjusted terms simply by replicating portfolios 
already held by other funds within the same company. Furthermore, it is not the case that 
global funds yield lower returns in exchange for lower tail risk, or that there is an 
insurance premium embedded in the returns of global funds. Namely, global funds do not 
appear to be better suited to avoid large losses given their ability to shift their stock 
holdings across countries and regions. In fact, the skewness and kurtosis of global funds 
are similar to those of portfolios of specialized funds.  
The evidence presented in this paper points to significant challenges in the 
prospects for broad international diversification. To the extent that global funds continue 
to be large relative to specialized funds, the findings in this paper suggest that the forgone 
diversification gains can be significant. At the same time, many countries and firms 
might not be able to benefit from tapping international investors and might thus face 
higher financing costs. These implications suggest that recent findings in the literature, 
such as an increase in the extent of international diversification (or a decline in home 
bias), might still require more analysis.  
Several other puzzling aspects remain for future research, in particular in light of 
the seemingly important effects of organizational aspects on international diversification. 
Given the potential gains from investing across countries, why are global funds not more 
internationally diversified? Perhaps there are limits to the number of stocks that each 
manager can follow, determined by their own capacity to manage many more than 100 
stocks and the investment practices and tools that each mutual fund family adopts. It also 
seems difficult for global fund managers to expand their holdings by relying on 
specialized fund managers. Moreover, it is possible that the remuneration schemes give 
no incentives for the information gathered by specialized funds to be freely shared within 
each mutual fund company, with each fund manager collecting her own information and 
competing with other managers. However, why do mutual fund families not establish 
funds of funds, mainly constructing portfolios based on specialized funds? Mutual fund 
families might have few incentives to do so because it could undermine the growth of    37 
their global funds, which are the ones that have expanded substantially over the years and 
generated large revenues. Alternatively, given the differences in the performance of 
specialized funds relative to global funds, why do investors not arbitrage these 
differences and favor specialized funds over global ones? What are the limits to 
arbitrage? Also, why are family effects so important? Organizational aspects of mutual 
fund companies seem to be behind these effects. But what specific factors make funds 
within families hold a similar number of stocks? Furthermore, what are the costs of the 
organizational practices? Our findings on the unexploited gains from international 
diversification might provide a rough, first lower-bound estimate of the welfare costs 
implied by mutual fund organizational norms. Finally, do global funds provide 
diversification benefits not captured by the mean-variance and other analyses performed 
in this paper?  
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Figure 1. Stylized Structure of U.S. Mutual Fund Families
Foreign Funds U.S. Funds
World Funds
Emerging Market Funds
+   … +   …
This figure characterizes the organization of U.S. mutual fund families that invest in foreign assets. The figure also shows our classification of global and specialized funds. Global funds include both world and foreign funds.
Specialized funds include: emerging market funds, regional funds, and country funds. The names used to characterize the specialized funds are just examples.
Country Fund   
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Assets under Management (RHS)
Assets under Management - Excluding U.S. Assets (RHS)
Number of Funds
Assets under Management (RHS)
This figure shows the total number of mutual funds in our holdings database and their total assets under management by
fund type from 1991 to 2005. For global funds, the value of assets under management invested in non-U.S. assets is also
shown (starting in 1997 due to data availability). Data on assets under management are in billions of U.S. dollars. Global
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Assets under Management - Excluding U.S. Assets (RHS)
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World Funds World Funds - Excluding U.S. Holdings






This figure shows the median number of stock holdings by mutual fund type from 1991 to 2005. The top panel
includes world funds, foreign funds, emerging market funds, and regional funds. The median number of non-
U.S. holdings for world funds is also shown (starting in 1997 due to data availability). The bottom panel

























World Funds World Funds - Excluding U.S. Holdings


















































This figure shows the total number of stock holdings for all mutual funds in our sample as a percentage of the total number of listed stocks by country. Countries are sorted according to their average ratio in the
1997-2004 period. Countries are divided into five groups (quintiles) and the average and maximum values for each quintile are reported. The U.S. is excluded from the figure. The data for the total number of listed



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Max: 77.3%Figure 5. Evolution of Entropy Measure
Total Holdings - Excluding U.S. Holdings
















This figure shows the evolution of the entropy measure from 1997 to 2005. The entropy measure captures the commonality
of stock holdings in the portfolios of global funds and specialized funds. The top panel includes stock holdings in all
countries except the U.S. The bottom panel includes stock holdings in developing countries only. The thick line represents
the median value across families in a given year. The dotted grey lines represent +/- one standard deviation from the median.

























1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005Figure 6. Evolution of Entropy Measure by Number of Common Managers
Total Holdings - Excluding U.S. Holdings


















This figure shows the evolution of the entropy measure according to the number of common managers shared by global funds and
specialized funds within mutual fund families from 1997 to 2005. The entropy measure captures the commonality of stock holdings in
the portfolios of global funds and specialized funds. The entropy measure is reported for family-year observations in which funds share
no managers, at least one common manager, and more than three common managers. The figure also reports the entropy measure by
itself (black-dotted line), as reported in Figure 5. The figure reports the median value across families in a given year. The top panel
includes stock holdings in all countries except the U.S. The bottom panel includes stock holdings in developing countries only. Global
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Entropy Entropy: No Common Manager















































































































Average:  149 Stocks
Median: 95 Stocks
Std. Dev.:  186 Stocks
73% of Obs. below 150 Holdings
86% of Obs. below 250 Holdings
91% of Obs. below 350 Holdings
This figure shows the dispersion in the number of stock holdings by mutual funds and mutual fund
families during the 1991-2005 period. The top panel shows a histogram with the distribution of the
number of stock holdings for all mutual funds in our sample. The bottom panel reports the median
number of stock holdings by mutual fund family. All funds in any given family are considered.
Families are sorted according to their median number of stock holdings during the 1991-2005 period.














































































































































Average:  149 Stocks
Median: 95 Stocks
Std. Dev.:  186 Stocks
73% of Obs. below 150 Holdings
86% of Obs. below 250 Holdings
91% of Obs. below 350 HoldingsFigure 8. Evolution of Within-Fund Entropy Measure
Total Holdings - Excluding U.S. Holdings
















This figure shows the evolution of the within-fund entropy measure by fund type from 1997 to 2005. The within-fund
entropy measure captures the commonality of stock holdings in two consecutive years for each individual mutual fund. The
figure reports the median value across families in a given year. The top panel includes stock holdings in all countries except
the U.S. The bottom panel includes stock holdings in developing countries only. Specialized funds include: emerging market
























1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
World Funds Foreign Funds Specialized FundsSample 1991-2005
Frequency Annual
Number of Families 499
Total Number of Funds 1,904
Total Number of Fund-Year Observations 8,420
Total Number of Asset-Level Holdings  1,359,750
Sample September 1989 - June 2006
Frequency Daily
N b f F ili 36
Table 1. Data Coverage
Holdings Data
Price Data
Number of Families 36
Total Number of Funds 371
Total Number of Observations 722,885
This table describes the two datasets analyzed in this paper. The source of the data on
mutual fund stock holdings is Morningstar International Equity Mutual Funds. The source
of the mutual fund price data is Bloomberg.Average Median Std. Dev.
Fund Type
Global Funds 155 96 196
   World Funds 136 106 132
        Excluding U.S. Holdings 101 76 100
   Foreign Funds 175 105 219
Specialized Funds 117 79 136
   Emerging Market Funds 161 121 138
   Asia Funds 89 65 110
   Europe Funds 111 71 158
   Latin America Funds 58 56 24
Table 2. Number of Mutual Fund Holdings
   Latin America Funds 58 56 24
   Country Funds 126 63 178
All Funds 150 95 186
This table shows the average, median, and standard deviation of the number of
stock holdings by mutual fund type over the 1991-2005 period.Fund Type Asia Developed Europe Latin America
Regional Funds
  Median Number of Holdings 60 62 41
     Emerging Market Funds -33% - -34%
     Foreign Funds -42% -5% -93%
     World Funds -69% -49% -94%
Fund Type Asia Developed Europe Latin America
Regional Funds
  Median Number of Countries 8 12 6
Table 3. Differences in Holdings within Regions by Fund Type
Number of Holdings
Number of Countries
(In Percent, Relative to Regional Funds)
Drop in Holdings in Each Region by Fund Type
Drop in Countries in Each Region by Fund Type
(In Percent Relative to Regional Funds)
     Emerging Market Funds -10% - -17%
     Foreign Funds -30% 0% -72%
     World Funds -36% -14% -75%
This table reports differences across fund types in regional stock and country holdings over the 1997-2005
period. The top panel shows the differences in the number of stock holdings across fund types. The bottom
panel shows the differences in the number of countries receiving investments from different fund types. The
first row in each panel reports the median number of stock or country holdings in a given region for the
corresponding regional funds. Differences are then calculated as the percentage change of this median number
of stock holdings of a fund relative to those of the corresponding regional fund. Comparisons are made within
mutual fund families. Families without the corresponding regional funds are excluded from the analysis.
(In Percent, Relative to Regional Funds)Total 30,319 9,086 30% 6,267 21%
Developed Countries 12,987 6,815 52% 4,953 38%
     Asia 5,760 3,249 56% 2,246 39%
     Europe 6,392 3,459 54% 2,635 41%
     Middle East 802 87 11% 54 7%
Developing Countries 17,332 2,271 13% 1,314 8%
     Asia 10,089 1,304 13% 693 7%
     Europe 2,697 319 12% 167 6%
     Latin America  2,196 399 18% 297 14%
     Middle East & Africa 2,350 249 11% 157 7%
Total 39,061 6,289 16% 5,510 14%
Developed Countries 18,282 5,204 28% 4,799 26%
     Asia 7,758 2,748 35% 2,429 31%
E 9 817 2 392 24% 2 315 24%
Table 4. Mutual Fund Holdings
1997
2004










As a Percentage of 
All Listed Stocks
     Europe 9,817 2,392 24% 2,315 24%
     Middle East 686 45 7% 37 5%
Developing Countries 20,779 1,085 5% 711 3%
     Asia 10,444 566 5% 394 4%
     Europe 6,279 184 3% 114 2%
     Latin America  1,525 195 13% 141 9%
     Middle East & Africa 2,531 140 6% 62 2%
This table shows the number of listed stocks and the number of stock holdings for mutual funds in developed and developing countries
across selected regions. The top panel shows data for 1997; the bottom panel shows data for 2004. The first column shows the total
number of listed stocks across the countries' main stock exchanges within each region. The second and third columns show the number
of stock holdings for all U.S. equity mutual funds in these regions, in absolute terms and as a percentage of the universe of listed stocks.
The fourth and fifth columns report the same numbers for global funds only. The data on stock listings come from the Global Financial
Database. Stock holdings in the U.S. and offshore financial centers are excluded from the table.Average Median Std. Dev.
Fund Type
Global Funds 0.12% 0.01% 0.75% 899
   World Funds 0.18% 0.01% 0.86% 1,320
   Foreign Funds 0.11% 0.01% 0.72% 758
Specialized Funds 0.12% 0.02% 0.59% 277
   Emerging Market Funds 0.15% 0.02% 0.70% 369
   Asia Funds 0.12% 0.01% 0.53% 132
   Europe Funds 0.08% 0.01% 0.35% 346
iA i d 0 10% 0 02% 04 % 144
Total Holdings over
Stock Market Capitalization
Table 5. Size of Mutual Fund Holdings
Average Mutual 
Fund Size         
(US$ Million)
   Latin America Funds 0.10% 0.02% 0.47% 144
This table shows the average, median, and standard deviation of the total amount of mutual fund
foreign holdings as a percentage of stock market capitalization over the 1997-2005 period by fund
type. The average size of mutual funds, in millions of U.S. dollars, is also reported. The data on




[No. of Observations] [396,388]
Not Being Held Being Held
Specialized Funds










Total Holdings - Excluding U.S. Holdings












[No. of Observations] [92,175]
This table shows frequency counts for mutual fund stock holdings from 1997 to 2005. The reported numbers
correspond to the probability of being held (or not) by certain types of mutual funds, given that a mutual fund family
has both fund types. The top panel includes stock holdings in all countries except the U.S., whereas the bottom panel
includes stock holdings in developing countries only. Each observation is a family-year-stock observation. The total
number of observations is reported in brackets in the "Total" row of each table. When a global fund in a given family-
year holds a stock in a country not covered by the specialized funds within that family in that year, this observation is
counted in the "No Specialized Fund" row. Global funds include both world funds and foreign funds. Specialized










Number of Common Managers 0.061 *** 0.059 *** 0.054 *** 0.053 ***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.008] [0.008]
No Common Manager (NCM0) 0.292 *** 0.207 *** 0.363 *** 0.409 ***
[0.018] [0.042] [0.019] [0.043]
One Common Manager (NCM1) 0.362 *** 0.284 *** 0.353 *** 0.396 ***
[0.034] [0.052] [0.033] [0.051]
Two Common Managers (NCM2) 0.421 *** 0.329 *** 0.553 *** 0.583 ***
[0.031] [0.049] [0.037] [0.054]
At Least Three Common Managers (NCM3) 0.543 *** 0.456 *** 0.589 *** 0.633 ***
[0.035] [0.052] [0.032] [0.053]
Year Dummies
Table 7. Commonality in Holdings across Fund Types
Dependent Variable: Entropy Measure
Holdings in Developing Countries Only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Holdings
(5) (6) (7) (8)




NCM0 = NCM1 3.390 * 4.060 ** 0.070 0.120
NCM0 = NCM2 13.190 *** 11.050 *** 20.670 *** 17.830 ***
NCM0 = NCM3 40.800 *** 42.230 *** 36.840 *** 36.510 ***
This table reports regressions of the entropy measure on the number of common managers and, alternatively, on dummy variables indicating whether funds within a family-year share no common manager or
one, two, or three common managers. The entropy measure captures the commonality of stock holdings in the portfolios of global funds and specialized funds. The sample period is 1997-2005. T-tests of
equality of the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables capturing the number of common managers are reported. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. Standard deviations are shown in
























Table 8. Portfolio Choice of Mutual Funds: Importance of Year, Fund Type, and Family Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: Number of Stock Holdings
0.48
Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes
0.01 0.02 0.46 0.03 0.46 0.47
Yes
No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes No Yes
6,394
0.01 0.11 0.36 0.12 0.38 0.43 0.44
6,394 6,394 6,394 6,394 6,394 6,394
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Net Assets in Top Ten Holdings






In the top panel, the table reports regressions of the number of stock holdings on year dummies, fund type dummies, and/or family dummies. In the bottom panel, the table reports
regressions of the percentage of net assets in the top ten stock holdings on year dummies, fund type dummies, and/or family dummies. The R-squared of these regressions is reported. The
sample period is 1997-2005. Standard errors are clustered at the family level.
Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes
Yes Yes
No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No Yes No
6,379 6,379 6,379 6,379 6,379 6,379 6,379Independent Variables
Number of Managers 16.180 *** 14.762 *** 4.693 4.601 -0.554 *** -0.529 *** -0.186 -0.179
[4.655] [4.569] [3.702] [3.703] [0.175] [0.178] [0.188] [0.187]
Dummy: 1 Manager 132.60 *** 29.07 ***
[10.800] [0.545]
Dummy: 2 Managers 135.20 *** 27.58 ***
[8.694] [0.664]
Dummy: 3 Managers 153.60 *** 25.59 ***
[19.300] [1.012]
Dummy: 4 Managers 166.20 *** 24.66 ***
[20.100] [2.284]
Dummy: 5 Managers 152.20 *** 24.30 ***
[16.560] [1.100]
Dummy: 6 Managers 196.90 *** 22.75 ***
[31.310] [2.323]
Dummy: 7 or More Managers 221.70 *** 26.80 ***
[28.130] [0.971]
Manager Tenure 2.964 1.468 2.260 * 2.243 * -0.067 -0.033 -0.133 -0.129
[2.488] [2.255] [1.208] [1.203] [0.118] [0.115] [0.084] [0.084]
Fund Age 0.211 0.316 -1.027 -1.013 -0.129 ** -0.106 ** -0.126 ** -0.128 ***
[0 775] [0 845] [0 863] [0 863] [0 053] [0 052] [0 049] [0 049]
Table 9. Portfolio Choice of Mutual Funds: Importance of Family Effects
Dependent Variable: Number of Stock Holdings Dependent Variable: Percentage of Net Assets in Top Ten Holdings
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
[0.775] [0.845] [0.863] [0.863] [0.053] [0.052] [0.049] [0.049]
Family Expenses -0.650 ** -0.014 -0.001 -0.010
[0.252] [0.160] [0.011] [0.009]
Family Size 7.535 *** 0.575 -0.062 0.053






This table reports regressions of the number of stock holdings and the percentage of net assets in the top ten stock holdings on the number of managers, manager tenure, fund age, mutual fund family expenses, and
mutual fund family size. Depending on the specification, year, fund type, and/or family dummies are included. Family expenses are in millions of U.S. dollars and family size is in billions of U.S. dollars. Fund age is
expressed in years. The sample period is 1997-2005. Standard errors are clustered at the family level. Standard deviations are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at one, five, and ten percent,
respectively.


























































  World Funds 6.22% 11.01% 4.85% 0.87% 0.78% 63
  Foreign Funds 6.03% 9.95% 4.03% 0.97% 0.89% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.53% 15.23% 4.55% 0.86% 0.80% 25
Total 6.78% 11.14% 4.42% 0.92% 0.84% 165
Weekly Data
  World Funds 6.28% 11.33% 5.08% 2.05% 1.92% 63
  Foreign Funds 6.04% 9.70% 3.74% 2.25% 2.13% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.54% 15.16% 4.44% 1.99% 1.90% 25
Total 6.80% 11.13% 4.36% 2.14% 2.01% 165












  World Funds 6.22% 10.68% 4.46% 0.87% 0.83% 63
Foreign Funds 6.03% 10.49% 4.49% 0.97% 0.92% 77






Table 10. Simulations Using the Largest Number of Funds
Minimizing the Variance
Standard Deviation of 
Returns
Maximizing Expected Returns
Average Returns           
(Per Year)






  Foreign Funds 6.03% 10.49% 4.49% 0.97% 0.92% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.53% 14.21% 3.59% 0.86% 0.83% 25
Total 6.78% 11.12% 4.34% 0.92% 0.87% 165
Weekly Data
  World Funds 6.28% 12.48% 6.09% 2.05% 2.13% 63
  Foreign Funds 6.04% 11.14% 4.98% 2.25% 2.30% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.54% 16.67% 5.74% 1.99% 2.10% 25
Total 6.80% 12.47% 5.52% 2.14% 2.20% 165
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds. Simulated global
funds are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top panel
shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on expected returns. The bottom panel shows the results of
maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the largest number of
available specialized funds for each global fund in each family. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds.
The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with different scopes,
e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily or weekly depending on the data frequency
considered. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. Annualized differences in
accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed. Averages across simulations are then computed and












  World Funds 6.81% 9.50% 2.79% 0.91% 0.84% 63
  Foreign Funds 5.09% 7.69% 2.75% 0.97% 0.90% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 7.67% 11.62% 4.00% 0.92% 0.85% 25
Total 6.13% 8.97% 2.95% 0.94% 0.87% 165
Weekly Data
  World Funds 8.07% 9.78% 2.44% 2.66% 2.16% 63
  Foreign Funds 5.11% 7.33% 2.33% 2.25% 2.16% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 7.87% 11.93% 4.08% 2.17% 2.03% 25
Total 6.65% 8.95% 2.64% 2.40% 2.14% 165












  World Funds 6.81% 9.60% 2.86% 0.91% 0.85% 63
  Foreign Funds 5.09% 7.98% 2.98% 0.97% 0.92% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 7.67% 11.22% 3.59% 0.92% 0.88% 25
Table 11. Simulations Using the Longest Available Sample
Average Returns             
(Per Year)







Average Returns             
(Per Year)







  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 7.67% 11.22% 3.59% 0.92% 0.88% 25
Total 6.13% 9.08% 3.02% 0.94% 0.88% 165
Weekly Data
  World Funds 8.07% 10.87% 3.20% 2.66% 2.37% 63
  Foreign Funds 5.11% 8.35% 3.20% 2.25% 2.26% 77
  Pools of World or Foreign Funds 7.87% 13.55% 5.51% 2.17% 2.22% 25
Total 6.65% 10.08% 3.55% 2.40% 2.30% 165
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds. Simulated global funds
are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top panel shows the
results of minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on expected returns. The bottom panel shows the results of maximizing expected
returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the longest time series for each global fund in each
family. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that
include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth
funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily or weekly depending on the data frequency considered. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are
calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each











World Funds 8.71% 12.10% 3.43% 0.88% 0.82% 56
Foreign Funds 5.99% 9.68% 3.79% 0.97% 0.91% 77
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.60% 14.88% 4.20% 0.86% 0.85% 24
Total 7.65% 11.32% 3.72% 0.92% 0.87% 157











World Funds 8.71% 11.96% 3.36% 0.88% 0.78% 56
Foreign Funds 5.99% 10.41% 4.51% 0.97% 0.90% 77
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.60% 14.69% 4.00% 0.86% 0.83% 24






Table 12. Benchmarking: Simulations Using the Largest Number of Funds




Average Returns           
(Per Year)






Total 7.65% 11.61% 4.02% 0.92% 0.85% 157
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds. Simulated global
funds are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top panel
shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns relative to a benchmark index subject to a restriction on expected returns. The bottom panel
shows the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns relative to a benchmark index. The simulations
use portfolios that include the largest number of available specialized funds for each global fund in each family. An appropriate benchmark index is
used for each simulation. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are
simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and
world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as
described in the main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed.











World Funds 7.83% 10.28% 2.56% 0.91% 0.85% 63
Foreign Funds 5.06% 7.53% 2.58% 0.97% 0.91% 77
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 7.49% 11.66% 4.24% 0.93% 0.89% 24
Total 6.47% 9.18% 2.82% 0.94% 0.89% 164











World Funds 7.83% 10.13% 2.48% 0.91% 0.82% 63
Foreign Funds 5.06% 8.19% 3.28% 0.97% 0.90% 77
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 7.49% 12.44% 4.94% 0.93% 0.87% 24
Table 13. Benchmarking: Simulations Using the Longest Available Sample




Average Returns            
(Per Year)












Total 6.47% 9.55% 3.22% 0.94% 0.86% 164
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds. Simulated global
funds are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top panel
shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns relative to a benchmark index subject to a restriction on expected returns. The bottom
panel shows the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns relative to a benchmark index. The
simulations use portfolios that include the longest time series for each global fund in each family. An appropriate benchmark index is used for
each simulation. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are
simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and
world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as
described in the main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed.
Averages across simulations are then computed and reported. Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis
Type of Global Funds
World Funds -0.63 10.15 -0.70 8.78 63
[0.99] [14.56] [0.93] [16.21]
Foreign Funds -0.83 12.47 -0.97 11.13 77
[1.21] [19.55] [0.87] [11.13]
Pools of World or Foreign Funds -0.42 6.57 -0.79 9.85 25
[0.49] [5.64] [0.90] [11.91]
Total -0.69 10.69 -0.84 10.04 165
[1.05] [16.31] [0.90] [13.37]
Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis
Type of Global Funds
World Funds -0.63 10.15 -0.57 6.12 63
[0.99] [14.56] [0.40] [4.71]
Foreign Funds -0.83 12.47 -0.86 9.28 77
Table 14. Skewness and Kurtosis Based on Simulations Using the Largest Number of Funds
Daily Returns on Global Funds




Daily Returns on Simulated 
Global Funds




Foreign Funds 0.83 12.47 0.86 9.28 77
[1.21] [19.55] [0.65] [6.55]
Pools of World or Foreign Funds -0.42 6.57 -0.57 7.03 25
[0.49] [5.64] [0.55] [3.95]
Total -0.69 10.69 -0.70 7.74 165
[1.05] [16.31] [0.57] [5.73]
This table shows the average skewness and kurtosis of returns of global funds and simulated global funds. Simulated global funds are
constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top
panel shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on the expected return. The bottom panel shows
the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns. The simulations use portfolios that
include the largest number of available specialized funds for each global fund in each family. Global funds are world funds, foreign
funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world (or foreign)
funds within the same family but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio
weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text.
Standard deviations of both skewness and kurtosis are reported in brackets.Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis
Type of Global Funds
World Funds -0.82 13.70 -0.82 11.19 63
[1.10] [16.07] [0.84] [12.48]
Foreign Funds -0.92 14.18 -1.06 13.21 77
[1.23] [20.34] [0.90] [12.37]
Pools of World or Foreign Funds -0.44 6.61 -0.83 10.07 25
[0.43] [4.48] [0.88] [11.86]
Total -0.81 12.85 -0.94 11.96 165
[1.10] [17.30] [0.88] [12.33]
Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis
Type of Global Funds
World Funds -0.82 13.70 -0.63 7.98 63
[1.10] [16.07] [0.51] [7.52]
Foreign Funds -0.92 14.18 -0.87 9.55 77
Table 15. Skewness and Kurtosis Based on Simulations Using the Longest Available Sample
Daily Returns on Global Funds
Daily Returns on Simulated 
Global Funds Number of 
Comparisons
Daily Returns on Global Funds
Daily Returns on Simulated 





[1.23] [20.34] [0.61] [6.09]
Pools of World or Foreign Funds -0.44 6.61 -0.60 7.22 25
[0.43] [4.48] [0.50] [3.69]
Total -0.81 12.85 -0.74 8.60 165
[1.10] [17.30] [0.57] [6.44]
This table shows the average skewness and kurtosis of returns of global funds and simulated global funds. Simulated global funds are
constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top
panel shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on the expected return. The bottom panel shows
the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns. The simulations use portfolios that
include the longest time series for each global fund in each family. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or
foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family
but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily.
Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. Standard deviations of both
skewness and kurtosis are reported in brackets.Global Funds




Largest Number of Funds Simulations
MSCI Returns between 0% and -1% -0.37% -0.27% 3.27 *** 4,878
MSCI Returns between -1% and -5% -1.53% -1.49% 1.71 * 10,193
MSCI Returns between -5% and -10% -4.00% -4.35% -2.24 ** 950
MSCI Returns less than -10% -3.42% -3.45% -0.12 191
Longest Available Sample Simulations
MSCI Returns between 0% and -1% -0.30% -0.25% 2.24 ** 7,292
MSCI Returns between -1% and -5% -1.50% -1.48% 0.81 14,342
MSCI Returns between -5% and -10% -4.06% -4.35% -2.11 ** 1,297
MSCI Returns less than -10% -3.65% -3.74% -0.40 287
Maximizing Expected Returns
Largest Number of Funds Simulations
MSCI Returns between 0% and -1% -0.37% -0.29% 2.63 *** 4,878
MSCI Returns between -1% and -5% -1.53% -1.61% -3.27 *** 10,193
MSCI Returns between -5% and -10% -4.00% -4.65% -4.22 *** 950
MSCI Returns less than -10% -3.42% -3.70% -0.96 191
Table 16. Average Returns Conditional on MSCI Emerging Market Index Returns





Longest Available Sample Simulations
MSCI Returns between 0% and -1% -0.30% -0.27% 1.39 7,292
MSCI Returns between -1% and -5% -1.50% -1.59% -4.10 *** 14,342
MSCI Returns between -5% and -10% -4.06% -4.65% -4.38 *** 1,297
MSCI Returns less than -10% -3.65% -4.11% -1.88 * 287
This table shows the average returns of both global funds and simulated global funds conditional on negative returns on the MSCI
Emerging Market Index. Simulated global funds are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund
family using two different procedures. The top part shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on the
expected return. The bottom part shows the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns.
Simulations are performed on daily returns. Aggregate weekly (Wednesday) returns are reported. Simulations using portfolios that
include the largest number of available specialized funds for each global fund in each family and using portfolios that include the longest
time series for each global fund in each family are displayed. T-statistics for the test of equality of means are shown. A positive t-statistic
means that returns of the simulated global fund are larger than those of global funds.Global Funds




Largest Number of Funds Simulations
Simulated Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.52% -0.48% 4.03 *** 6,380
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.21% -2.18% 2.08 ** 8,946
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -6.06% -6.36% -2.63 *** 582
Simulated Global Fund Returns less than -10% -11.71% -12.51% -1.57 99
Longest Available Sample Simulations
Simulated Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.49% -0.47% 2.93 *** 9,340
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.22% -2.19% 1.89 * 12,529
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -6.23% -6.37% -1.69 * 907
Simulated Global Fund Returns less than -10% -11.89% -12.74% -2.08 ** 156
Maximizing Expected Returns
Largest Number of Funds Simulations
Simulated Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.49% -0.47% 1.32 6,183
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.14% -2.22% -4.43 *** 9,265
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -5.69% -6.23% -4.84 *** 631
Simulated Global Fund Returns less than -10% -11.52% -12.47% -2.14 ** 100
Table 17. Average Returns Conditional on Simulated Global Fund Returns
Number of 
Observations
Average Returns (Per Week)
T-test:             
(P) = (G)
Longest Available Sample Simulations
Simulated Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.47% -0.47% 0.02 9,079
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.16% -2.21% -3.76 *** 12,854
Simulated Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -6.01% -6.27% -2.96 *** 963
Simulated Global Fund Returns less than -10% -12.04% -12.41% -1.01 146
This table shows the average returns for both global funds and simulated global funds conditional on negative returns on the simulated global fund.
Simulated global funds are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different
procedures. The top part shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on the expected return. The bottom part
shows the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns. Simulations are performed on daily returns.
Aggregate weekly (Wednesday) returns are reported. Simulations using portfolios that include the largest number of available specialized funds for
each global fund in each family and using portfolios that include the longest time series for each global fund in each family are displayed. T-
statistics for the test of equality of means are shown. A positive t-statistic means that returns of the simulated global fund are larger than those of
global funds.Global Funds




Largest Number of Funds Simulations
Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.47% -0.34% 11.74 *** 6,371
Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.23% -1.91% 19.92 *** 9,273
Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -6.36% -5.25% 13.83 *** 784
Global Fund Returns less than -10% -13.02% -10.84% 4.57 *** 113
Longest Available Sample Simulations
Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.47% -0.37% 11.94 *** 9,297
Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.23% -1.99% 17.56 *** 12,840
Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -6.46% -5.55% 13.60 *** 1,140
Global Fund Returns less than -10% -13.24% -11.36% 4.89 *** 163
Maximizing Expected Returns
Largest Number of Funds Simulations
Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.47% -0.36% 8.68 *** 6,371
Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.23% -1.98% 15.00 *** 9,273
Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -6.36% -5.22% 13.61 *** 784
Global Fund Returns less than 10% 13 02% 10 37% 58 9*** 113
Table 18. Average Returns Conditional on Global Fund Returns
Average Returns (Per Week)
Number of 
Observations
T-test:             
(P) = (G)
Global Fund Returns less than -10% -13.02% -10.37% 5.89 *** 113
Longest Available Sample Simulations
Global Fund Returns between 0% and -1% -0.47% -0.40% 8.14 *** 9,297
Global Fund Returns between -1% and -5% -2.23% -2.02% 15.01 *** 12,840
Global Fund Returns between -5% and -10% -6.46% -5.43% 15.29 *** 1,140
Global Fund Returns less than -10% -13.24% -10.84% 6.80 *** 163
This table shows the average returns for both global funds and simulated global funds conditional on negative returns on the global funds.
Simulated global funds are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different
procedures. The top part shows the results of minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on the expected return. The bottom
part shows the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of returns. Simulations are performed on daily
returns. Aggregate weekly (Wednesday) returns are reported. Simulations using portfolios that include the largest number of available
specialized funds for each global fund in each family and using portfolios that include the longest time series for each global fund in each
family are displayed. T-statistics for the test of equality of means are shown. A positive t-statistic means that returns of the simulated global
fund are larger than those of global funds.Mutual Fund Family Beginning End
1 AIM Family of Funds 17 Apr. 92 Jul. 05
2 Alliance Bernstein 10 Dec. 99 Jun. 06
3 Allianz Funds 4 Dec. 04 Jul. 05
4 American Funds Group 7 Mar. 02 Jun. 06
5 Columbia Funds 8 Oct. 00 Jun. 06
6 Credit Suisse 8 Dec. 01 Jun. 06
7 DFA Investment Dimensions Group 9 Mar. 93 Jul. 05
8 Dreyfus Founders 11 Jul. 96 Jun. 06
9 Eaton Vance Group 7 Sep. 99 Jul. 05
10 Evergreen Funds 5 Sep. 94 Jun. 06
11 Excelsior Funds 4 Sep. 93 Jul. 05
12 Fidelity Advisors Funds 14 Dec. 00 Jun. 06
13 Fidelity Group 18 Sep. 89 Jul. 05
14 GAM Funds 7 Jan. 90 Jul. 05
15 Gartmore 5 Jul. 04 Jun. 06
16 GMO LLC 17 Jan. 99 Jul. 05
17 Goldman Sachs Asset Management Group 11 Oct. 98 Jul. 05
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 10 May 01 Jun. 06
19 ING Funds Trust 12 Nov. 94 Jul. 05
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 9 May 99 Jul. 05
21 J.P. Morgan Funds 10 Jul. 02 Jun. 06
Sample
Appendix Table 1. Price Data on Mutual Funds
Number of 
Funds
22 Janus 12 Oct. 98 Jun. 06
23 Merrill Lynch Group 15 Nov. 94 Jul. 05
24 MFS Family of Funds 11 Jun. 96 Jun. 06
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 26 Oct. 94 Jul. 05
26 Oppenheimer Funds 9 Sep. 04 Jun. 06
27 Putnam Funds 6 Nov. 91 Jul. 05
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 9 Jul. 90 Jul. 05
29 Scudder Funds 18 Jun. 98 Jul. 05
30 Seligman Group 4 Jun. 03 Jun. 06
31 Smith Barney Group 6 Mar. 98 Jun. 06
32 T. Rowe Price Funds 14 Jun. 92 Jul. 05
33 Templeton Group 20 Nov. 92 Jul. 05
34 UBS Funds 6 Mar. 01 Jun. 06
35 Vanguard Group 11 Jul. 00 Jun. 06
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 5 Oct. 97 Jul. 05
This table describes the number of funds and the beginning and the end of the price data sample for each
mutual fund family. The data source is Bloomberg.Not Being Held Being Held Not Being Held Being Held
Specialized Funds Specialized Funds
Probability of: Probability of:
Being Being
Held Held
Total 100% Total 100%
[No. of Observations] [180,744] [No. of Observations] [379,913]
Not Being Held Being Held Not Being Held Being Held


























Appendix Table 2. Probabilities of Being Held by a Mutual Fund (World Funds and Foreign Funds)
World Funds Foreign Funds
Probability of: Probability of: Total
49%
Not Being Not Being Specialized Funds Specialized Funds
Probability of: Probability of:
Being Being
Held Held
Total 100% Total 100%










This table shows frequency counts for mutual fund stock holdings from 1997 to 2005. The reported numbers correspond to the probability of being held (or not) by certain types of mutual funds, given
that a mutual fund family has both fund types. The top panel includes stock holdings in all countries except the U.S., whereas the bottom panel includes stock holdings in developing countries only.
Each observation is a family-year-stock observation. The total number of observations is reported in brackets in the "Total" row of each table. When a world fund or a foreign fund in a given family-
year holds a stock in a country not covered by the specialized funds within that family in that year, this observation is counted in the "No Specialized Fund" row. Specialized funds include: emerging










Number of Managers 17.020 *** 16.440 *** 4.773 -0.625 *** -0.626 *** -0.288 *
[4.946] [4.859] [3.775] [0.155] [0.157] [0.150]
Manager Tenure 2.145 1.268 2.338 * -0.018 -0.020 -0.172 **
[2.480] [2.250] [1.282] [0.123] [0.122] [0.085]
Fund Age -0.212 0.173 -1.276 -0.100 ** -0.099 ** -0.104 **
[0.831] [0.849] [0.850] [0.048] [0.048] [0.049]
Fund Expenses 0.432 *** -2.211 * 0.278 -0.029 *** -0.035 -0.076 **
[0.116] [1.269] [0.461] [0.007] [0.049] [0.036]
Fund Size 0.026 ** 0.001 0.000 0.001 **
[0.013] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000]
Year Dummies
Appendix Table 3. Portfolio Choice of Mutual Funds: Importance of Family Effects
(4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Number of Holdings Dependent Variable: Percentage of Net Assets in Top Ten Holdings





This table reports regressions of the number of stock holdings and the percentage of net assets in the top ten stock holdings on the number of managers, manager tenure, fund age, fund expenses, and fund size.
Depending on the specification, year and/or fund type dummies are included. The sample period is 1997-2005. Fund expenses and fund size are in millions of U.S. dollars. Fund age is expressed in years.






























1 Allianz Funds 0.95% -3.05% -3.91% 0.66% 0.65% 2
2 Alliance Bernstein 11.01% 12.90% 1.77% 0.81% 0.79% 8
3 American Funds Group 10.57% 13.93% 3.33% 0.87% 0.74% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 9.53% 22.55% 12.37% 0.90% 0.76% 10
5 Columbia Funds 17.58% 21.08% 3.28% 0.85% 0.77% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 12.15% 3.63% 0.95% 0.85% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions Group 2.97% 1.13% -1.64% 0.91% 0.85% 4
8 Dreyfus Founders 8.94% 15.90% 6.66% 0.87% 0.80% 6
9 Evergreen Funds 3.25% 1.69% -1.21% 1.12% 1.02% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group 5.63% 22.13% 16.40% 1.01% 0.71% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 3.95% 7.15% 3.13% 0.89% 0.87% 2
12 Fidelity Group 5.80% 9.46% 3.78% 1.03% 0.94% 6
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 7.76% 11.71% 3.96% 0.87% 0.76% 6
14 GAM Funds -7.63% -3.88% 4.40% 1.08% 0.96% 2
15 Gartmore 22.30% 18.99% -2.62% 0.81% 0.78% 3
16 GMO LLC 6.65% 8.05% 1.36% 0.76% 0.77% 8
17 Goldman Sachs Asset Management Group 1.63% 7.18% 5.84% 1.03% 0.91% 6
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 10.41% 13.49% 3.11% 0.98% 0.84% 2
19 ING Funds Trust -5.75% -1.34% 5.33% 1.12% 1.01% 6
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 1.35% 4.81% 3.77% 0.89% 0.76% 4
21 Janus -7.01% 0.08% 7.60% 0.67% 0.70% 5
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 22.11% 24.06% 1.68% 0.90% 0.87% 4
23 MFS Family of Funds 20.70% 39.09% 15.93% 0.88% 0.81% 3
24 Merrill Lynch Group 10.31% 12.78% 2.49% 1.01% 0.93% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 1.23% 4.47% 3.61% 1.01% 0.88% 11
26 Oppenheimer Funds 9.04% 9.06% -0.03% 0.80% 0.84% 4
Appendix Table 4A. Family Simulations Using the Largest Number of Funds






Standard Deviation              
of Daily Returns
Minimizing the Variance
27 Putnam Funds 4.86% 5.53% 0.74% 1.08% 1.05% 5
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 13.45% 22.06% 7.87% 0.84% 0.73% 2
29 Scudder Funds 8.56% 14.60% 5.85% 0.97% 0.86% 9
30 Smith Barney Group 8.79% 9.81% 0.90% 0.72% 0.74% 1
31 Seligman Group 14.45% 15.89% 1.26% 0.82% 0.82% 2
32 Templeton Group -3.58% -0.94% 3.04% 0.89% 0.77% 9
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 24.48% 38.61% 11.47% 0.82% 0.80% 6
34 UBS Funds 4.41% 7.30% 2.88% 0.89% 0.84% 1
35 Vanguard Group 7.77% 10.39% 2.54% 0.96% 0.92% 4
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 5.22% 11.69% 6.65% 0.98% 0.78% 2
Total 6.78% 11.14% 4.42% 0.92% 0.84% 165
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds by mutual fund family. Simulated global funds
are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family by minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on expected
returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the largest number of available specialized funds for each global fund in each family. Global funds are world funds,
foreign funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family
but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios
are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation











1 Allianz Funds 0.95% -3.95% -4.79% 0.66% 0.65% 2
2 Alliance Bernstein 11.01% 13.53% 2.32% 0.81% 0.79% 8
3 American Funds Group 10.57% 11.76% 1.22% 0.87% 0.81% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 9.53% 18.65% 8.69% 0.90% 0.79% 10
5 Columbia Funds 17.58% 20.34% 2.53% 0.85% 0.78% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 10.91% 2.40% 0.95% 0.89% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions Group 2.97% 1.52% -1.13% 0.91% 0.78% 4
8 Dreyfus Founders 8.94% 15.23% 5.96% 0.87% 0.83% 6
9 Evergreen Funds 3.25% 5.20% 2.53% 1.12% 0.91% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group 5.63% 20.00% 14.34% 1.01% 0.73% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 3.95% 11.10% 6.92% 0.89% 0.87% 2
12 Fidelity Group 5.80% 9.65% 3.69% 1.03% 1.03% 6
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 7.76% 11.79% 3.86% 0.87% 0.83% 6
14 GAM Funds -7.63% -2.36% 6.01% 1.08% 0.97% 2
15 Gartmore 22.30% 18.99% -2.66% 0.81% 0.80% 3
16 GMO LLC 6.65% 9.26% 2.41% 0.76% 0.80% 8
17 Goldman Sachs Asset Management Group 1.63% 4.30% 2.83% 1.03% 0.97% 6
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 10.41% 13.92% 3.44% 0.98% 0.87% 2
19 ING Funds Trust -5.75% 6.60% 14.46% 1.12% 1.06% 6
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 1.35% 5.22% 4.14% 0.89% 0.81% 4
21 Janus -7.01% 3.76% 11.31% 0.67% 0.82% 5
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 22.11% 23.09% 0.88% 0.90% 0.87% 4
23 MFS Family of Funds 20.70% 25.94% 4.49% 0.88% 0.83% 3
24 Merrill Lynch Group 10.31% 14.14% 3.76% 1.01% 0.92% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 1.23% 6.50% 5.52% 1.01% 0.95% 11
26 Oppenheimer Funds 9.04% 5.03% -3.87% 0.80% 0.91% 4






Standard Deviation              
of Daily Returns
Appendix Table 4B. Family Simulations Using the Largest Number of Funds
Maximizing Expected Returns
27 Putnam Funds 4.86% 5.03% 0.26% 1.08% 1.05% 5
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 13.45% 19.31% 5.39% 0.84% 0.76% 2
29 Scudder Funds 8.56% 15.98% 6.98% 0.97% 0.92% 9
30 Smith Barney Group 8.79% 11.87% 2.74% 0.72% 0.77% 1
31 Seligman Group 14.45% 16.85% 2.07% 0.82% 0.84% 2
32 Templeton Group -3.58% -2.40% 1.43% 0.89% 0.81% 9
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 24.48% 35.82% 9.19% 0.82% 0.81% 6
34 UBS Funds 4.41% 6.71% 2.27% 0.89% 0.85% 1
35 Vanguard Group 7.77% 8.77% 1.00% 0.96% 0.94% 4
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 5.22% 15.35% 10.03% 0.98% 0.83% 2
Total 6.78% 11.12% 4.34% 0.92% 0.87% 165
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds by mutual fund family. Simulated global funds
are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family by maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of
returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the largest number of available specialized funds for each global fund in each family. Global funds are world funds, foreign
funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with
different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are
calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed.











1 Allianz Funds 0.95% -3.05% -3.91% 0.66% 0.65% 2
2 Alliance Bernstein 9.36% 13.06% 3.48% 0.89% 0.86% 8
3 American Funds Group 10.57% 13.93% 3.33% 0.87% 0.74% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 7.34% 18.76% 11.17% 1.03% 0.89% 10
5 Columbia Funds 14.17% 17.04% 2.99% 0.92% 0.76% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 12.15% 3.63% 0.95% 0.85% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions Group 3.15% 1.22% -1.70% 0.91% 0.84% 4
8 Dreyfus Founders 4.71% 7.83% 3.33% 1.02% 0.92% 6
9 Evergreen Funds 5.76% 5.56% -0.21% 1.07% 1.08% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group -4.98% 8.94% 15.46% 1.13% 0.87% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 1.58% 1.67% 0.10% 0.99% 0.99% 2
12 Fidelity Group 7.08% 7.83% 0.91% 0.92% 0.83% 6
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 7.40% 9.99% 2.72% 0.93% 0.82% 6
14 GAM Funds 2.60% 1.54% -0.39% 1.03% 1.00% 2
15 Gartmore 22.30% 18.99% -2.62% 0.81% 0.78% 3
16 GMO LLC 6.65% 8.05% 1.36% 0.76% 0.77% 8
17 Goldman Sachs Asset Management Group 1.63% 7.18% 5.84% 1.03% 0.91% 6
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 6.10% 8.06% 2.17% 1.04% 0.91% 2
19 ING Funds Trust 0.96% 4.03% 3.53% 1.04% 0.93% 6
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 2.45% 5.57% 3.42% 0.92% 0.79% 4
21 Janus 4.97% 7.82% 2.75% 0.88% 0.87% 5
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 22.11% 24.06% 1.68% 0.90% 0.87% 4
23 MFS Family of Funds 12.47% 16.07% 3.19% 0.80% 0.82% 3
24 Merrill Lynch Group 5.09% 6.49% 1.57% 1.03% 0.96% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 2.47% 6.23% 4.00% 0.97% 0.87% 11
26 Oppenheimer Funds 12.15% 11.35% -0.77% 0.77% 0.80% 4
Average Returns              
(Per Year) Average Difference 
in Accumulated 
Daily Returns
Standard Deviation            
of Daily Returns
Appendix Table 5A. Family Simulations Using the Longest Available Sample
Minimizing the Variance
27 Putnam Funds 4.86% 5.53% 0.74% 1.08% 1.05% 5
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 3.46% 3.15% -0.28% 1.14% 1.13% 2
29 Scudder Funds 5.44% 10.47% 4.99% 0.99% 0.91% 9
30 Smith Barney Group 2.03% 2.35% 0.30% 0.94% 0.94% 1
31 Seligman Group 14.45% 15.89% 1.26% 0.82% 0.82% 2
32 Templeton Group 3.15% 3.41% 0.41% 0.80% 0.73% 9
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 5.04% 10.10% 5.07% 0.98% 0.92% 6
34 UBS Funds 4.41% 7.30% 2.88% 0.89% 0.84% 1
35 Vanguard Group 5.40% 7.05% 1.68% 0.99% 0.95% 4
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 6.44% 8.39% 2.18% 1.01% 0.88% 2
Total 6.13% 8.97% 2.95% 0.94% 0.87% 165
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds by mutual fund family. Simulated global
funds are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the mutual fund same family by minimizing the variance of returns subject to a restriction on
expected returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the longest time series for each global fund in each family. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a
pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with different
scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-
of-sample, as described in the main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed. Averages across











1 Allianz Funds 0.95% -3.95% -4.79% 0.66% 0.65% 2
2 Alliance Bernstein 9.36% 12.64% 3.08% 0.89% 0.86% 8
3 American Funds Group 10.57% 11.76% 1.22% 0.87% 0.81% 4
4 AIM Family of Funds 7.34% 15.96% 8.42% 1.03% 0.91% 10
5 Columbia Funds 14.17% 17.15% 2.94% 0.92% 0.80% 3
6 Credit Suisse 8.46% 10.91% 2.40% 0.95% 0.89% 2
7 DFA Investment Dimensions Group 3.15% 1.31% -1.53% 0.91% 0.78% 4
8 Dreyfus Founders 4.71% 6.54% 2.09% 1.02% 0.91% 6
9 Evergreen Funds 5.76% 7.06% 1.54% 1.07% 0.98% 2
10 Eaton Vance Group -4.98% 5.23% 11.44% 1.13% 0.92% 2
11 Excelsior Funds 1.58% 1.69% 0.20% 0.99% 0.96% 2
12 Fidelity Group 7.08% 8.26% 1.27% 0.92% 0.85% 6
13 Fidelity Advisors Funds 7.40% 10.33% 2.84% 0.93% 0.89% 6
14 GAM Funds 2.60% 2.45% 0.02% 1.03% 0.98% 2
15 Gartmore 22.30% 18.99% -2.66% 0.81% 0.80% 3
16 GMO LLC 6.65% 9.26% 2.41% 0.76% 0.80% 8
17 Goldman Sachs Asset Management Group 1.63% 4.30% 2.83% 1.03% 0.97% 6
18 Hartford Mutual Funds 6.10% 8.78% 2.80% 1.04% 0.93% 2
19 ING Funds Trust 0.96% 5.35% 5.32% 1.04% 0.91% 6
20 Ivy Mackenzie Management 2.45% 6.80% 4.56% 0.92% 0.84% 4
21 Janus 4.97% 10.57% 5.33% 0.88% 0.89% 5
22 J.P. Morgan Funds 22.11% 23.09% 0.88% 0.90% 0.87% 4
23 MFS Family of Funds 12.47% 14.85% 2.09% 0.80% 0.82% 3
24 Merrill Lynch Group 5.09% 8.85% 3.87% 1.03% 0.94% 9
25 Morgan Stanley Funds 2.47% 7.53% 5.22% 0.97% 0.93% 11
26 Oppenheimer Funds 12.15% 13.54% 1.28% 0.77% 0.77% 4
Average Returns                
(Per Year) Average Difference 
in Accumulated 
Daily Returns
Appendix Table 5B. Family Simulations Using the Longest Available Sample
Standard Deviation              
of Daily Returns
Maximizing Expected Returns
27 Putnam Funds 4.86% 5.03% 0.26% 1.08% 1.05% 5
28 RiverSource (former AXP) 3.46% 2.53% -0.46% 1.14% 0.99% 2
29 Scudder Funds 5.44% 11.08% 5.49% 0.99% 0.95% 9
30 Smith Barney Group 2.03% 2.41% 0.38% 0.94% 0.93% 1
31 Seligman Group 14.45% 16.85% 2.07% 0.82% 0.84% 2
32 Templeton Group 3.15% 4.13% 1.13% 0.80% 0.72% 9
33 T. Rowe Price Funds 5.04% 9.40% 4.37% 0.98% 0.92% 6
34 UBS Funds 4.41% 6.71% 2.27% 0.89% 0.85% 1
35 Vanguard Group 5.40% 5.17% -0.15% 0.99% 0.98% 4
36 Wells Fargo Advantage 6.44% 13.25% 6.77% 1.01% 0.87% 2
Total 6.13% 9.08% 3.02% 0.94% 0.88% 165
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds by mutual fund family. Simulated global funds
are constructed from actual global funds and specialized funds in the same mutual fund family by maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on the variance of
returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the longest time series for each global fund in each family. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world 
or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with different scopes, e.g. world
(foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as
described in the main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed. Averages across simulations











World Stock 9.10% 13.80% 4.52% 0.87% 0.77% 55
Foreign Stock 6.22% 10.19% 4.11% 0.97% 0.87% 75
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 11.81% 13.78% 1.64% 0.81% 0.75% 22
Total 8.05% 12.00% 3.90% 0.91% 0.82% 152











World Stock 9.10% 14.01% 4.59% 0.87% 0.83% 55
Foreign Stock 6.22% 10.93% 4.76% 0.97% 0.93% 75
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 11.81% 14.28% 1.89% 0.81% 0.78% 22






Appendix Table 6A. Rolling Window Simulations Using the Largest Number of Funds
Minimizing the Variance
Standard Deviation of Daily 
Returns
Maximizing Expected Returns
Average Returns           
(Per Year)






Total 8.05% 12.52% 4.28% 0.91% 0.87% 152
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds. Simulations only
use information on the previous 240 business days at each point in time. Simulated global funds are constructed from actual global funds and
specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top panel shows the results of minimizing the variance of
returns subject to a restriction on expected returns. The bottom panel shows the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on
the variance of returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the largest number of available specialized funds for each global fund in each
family. Global funds are world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that
include several world (or foreign) funds within the same family but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign)
growth funds. Portfolio weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the
main text. Annualized differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed. Averages across











World Stock 8.03% 10.46% 2.53% 0.90% 0.82% 62
Foreign Stock 5.35% 8.17% 2.99% 0.98% 0.89% 75
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.45% 12.94% 2.44% 0.88% 0.79% 23
Total 7.10% 9.73% 2.73% 0.93% 0.85% 160











World Stock 8.03% 10.85% 2.82% 0.90% 0.84% 62
Foreign Stock 5.35% 8.16% 2.90% 0.98% 0.93% 75
Pools of World or Foreign Funds 10.45% 12.89% 2.22% 0.88% 0.84% 23
Average Returns           
(Per Year)
Standard Deviation of Daily 
Returns Average Difference 
in Accumulated 
Daily Returns
Appendix Table 6B. Rolling Window Simulations Using the Longest Available Sample
Minimizing the Variance
Maximizing Expected Returns
Standard Deviation of Daily 
Returns
Average Returns           
(Per Year) Average Difference 
in Accumulated 
Daily Returns
Total 7.10% 9.87% 2.77% 0.93% 0.88% 160
This table shows differences in the average and standard deviation of returns between global funds and simulated global funds. Simulations only
use information on the previous 240 business days at each point in time. Simulated global funds are constructed from actual global funds and
specialized funds in the same mutual fund family using two different procedures. The top panel shows the results of minimizing the variance of
returns subject to a restriction on expected returns. The bottom panel shows the results of maximizing expected returns subject to a restriction on
the variance of returns. The simulations use portfolios that include the longest time series for each global fund in each family. Global funds are
world funds, foreign funds, and a pool of world or foreign funds. The pools of world or foreign funds are simulations that include several world
(or foreign) funds within the same family but with different scopes, e.g. world (foreign) value funds and world (foreign) growth funds. Portfolio
weights are updated daily. Realized returns of the simulated portfolios are calculated out-of-sample, as described in the main text. Annualized
differences in accumulated returns are calculated over the entire sample for each simulation performed. Averages across simulations are then
computed and reported. 